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New South Wales v. Commonwealth: The
Australian Tidelands Controversy
DR. EDWARD A. FITZGERALD*
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a great deal of conflict between the central and
peripheral governments of federal systems regarding jurisdiction over
offshore submerged lands. This conflict, known as the tidelands con-
troversy,' has occurred in the United States, Canada, and Australia.2
The focus of this conflict has been the control of valuable offshore
energy resources. This Article analyzes the Australian tidelands con-
troversy and compares it to the United States and Canadian disputes.
Beginning in the 1950s, Australia sought to develop its offshore
petroleum resources to meet its growing energy needs. In 1967, the
Australian Commonwealth ("Commonwealth") and state govern-
ments negotiated a common mining agreement that was designed to
preclude the lengthy litigation that had plagued offshore energy devel-
opment in the United States and was threatening to erupt in Canada. 3
This political settlement did not, however, prevent litigation. In 1973,
the Commonwealth asserted jurisdiction over the territorial sea and
continental shelf by establishing the Seas and Submerged Lands Act.4
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio.
B.A. 1971, Holy Cross College; J.D. 1974, Boston College; M.A. 1976, Northeastern Univer-
sity; Ph.D. 1983, Boston University.
1. ERNEST BARTLEY, THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY (1953); William K. Met-
calfe, The Tidelands Controversy: A Study in Development of a Political-Legal Problem, 4 SYR-
ACUSE L. REV. 39 (1953); HUBERT MARSHALL & BETTY ZISK, THE FEDERAL-STATE
STRUGGLE FOR OFFSHORE OIL (1966). The tidelands controversy was misnamed. Ownership
of the tidelands, which is the area between the high- and low-water marks, has never been in
question. Rather, the conflict focuses on the submerged lands seaward of the low-water mark.
2. Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Tidelands Controversy Revisited, 19 ENVTL. L. 209 (1988)
[hereinafter Fitzgerald, Tidelands Controversy]; Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Newfoundland Off-
shore Reference: Federal-Provincial Conflict Over Offshore Energy Resources, 23 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, Newfoundland].
3. This agreement was known as the Agreement Relating to the Exploration for, and the
Exploitation of, the Petroleum Resources, and Certain Other Resources, of the Continental
Shelf of Australia and of Certain Territories of the Commonwealth and of Certain Other Sub-
merged Land. It was executed October 16, 1967. Michael Crommelin, Offshore Oil and Gas
Rights: A Comparative Study, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 457, 478 n.148 (1974).
4. Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973, No. 161, 1973 AUSTL. ACTS P. 763.
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The states challenged the Commonwealth's offshore jurisdictional
claim. In 1975, the High Court of Australia, in New South Wales v.
Commonwealth,5 held that the states' jurisdiction terminated at the
low-water mark.6 As such, the Australian High Court found that the
Commonwealth's external affairs authority under section 51(xxix) of
the Australian Constitution established federal jurisdiction over the
territorial sea and continental shelf.
7
This Article demonstrates that the Australian High Court's deci-
sion in New South Wales was erroneous. During the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Crown held sovereign and proprietary rights over the
territorial sea. When the Australian colonies became self-governing,
they were granted jurisdiction over the territorial sea and the right to
the continental shelf resources. The colonies maintained their off-
shore jurisdiction upon their 1901 federation. The recognition of con-
tinental shelf rights under international law did not bolster the states'
jurisdictional claims, but simply legitimized these claims under inter-
national law. The Commonwealth's external affairs authority under
section 51 (xxix) of the Australian Constitution did not establish fed-
eral jurisdiction over the territorial sea or the continental shelf. The
Australian High Court erroneously relied on flawed decisions of the
United States and Canadian Supreme Courts in arriving at its deci-
sion.8 In 1979, a political settlement partially rectified the Australian
High Court's decision.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIA'S
OFFSHORE PETROLEUM RESOURCE LEGISLATION
Australia's dependence on oil imports from Indonesia and the
Middle East, prior to 1960, made it vulnerable to supply interruptions
and resulted in balance of payment deficits.9 Australia attempted to
develop a domestic petroleum industry through federal and state in-
centives.' 0 For example, the federal government subsidized explora-
tion operations in 1957 under the Petroleum Search Subsidy Scheme,
which extended to exploratory drilling and geophysical surveys be-
5. 135 C.L.R. 337 (1975) (Austl.).
6. Id. at 368.
7. Id. at 364.
8. Fitzgerald, Tidelands Controversy, supra note 2; Fitzgerald, Newfoundland, supra
note 2.
9. Andrew R. Thompson, Australia's Off-Shore Petroleum Common Code, 3 U.B.C. L.
REV. 1 (1968).
10. Crommelin, supra note 3, at 481; Thompson, supra note 9, at 1.
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yond existing production areas."
In 1960, the question of federal-state jurisdiction over offshore
energy development became a salient public policy concern. That
year, Broken Hill Proprietary Company, through its subsidiary, Hem-
atite Petroleum Proprietary Limited, acquired permits from the states
of South Australia, Tasmania, and Victoria to develop over 66,000
square miles of offshore lands.12 In 1962, the Commonwealth and
state ministers commenced negotiations to develop a regulatory
scheme for offshore energy development.13 The negotiators sought to
develop a stable statutory and regulatory framework that would en-
courage private industry to invest the large capital necessary for off-
shore energy development. The negotiators also sought to avoid the
litigation that had characterized United States offshore energy devel-
opment and was then threatening to erupt in Canada.' 4
On October 16, 1967, the Commonwealth and state governments
announced an agreement regarding offshore energy development.
The agreement, known as the Agreement Relating to the Exploration
for, and the Exploitation of, the Petroleum Resources, and Certain
Other Resources, of the Continental Shelf of Australia and of Certain
Territories of the Commonwealth and of Certain Other Submerged
Land ("1967 Agreement"), centered on a common mining code,
which was to be implemented through "mirror legislation" enacted by
both the Commonwealth and state governments.' 5 Offshore lands
were divided into adjacent areas, which included the territorial sea
and continental shelf, but excluded state internal waters.' 6 State law
applied to each state's adjacent area, while federal law applied to all
adjacent areas.' 7 The 1967 Agreement designated the states to regu-
late exploration and development in their adjacent areas. The states
were required to consult with the Commonwealth on matters of fed-
11. Initially, offshore energy exploration and development fell under state jurisdiction
because no federal statute governed such action. Crommelin, supra note 3, at 478.
12. Id.
13. Id.; Thompson, supra note 9, at 3-4, 8-26; A.N. Dakin, Future Patterns of Legislation
for the Petroleum Industry, 6 MELB. U. L. REV. 403 (1968).
14. Elliot Treby, Comment, The Role of the Political Idiom in Jurisdictional Conflicts
Over Off-Shore Oil and Gas, 5 MAR. L. & COM. 281, 287 (1974).
15. Crommelin, supra note 3, at 478 n. 148.
16. Agreement Relating to the Exploration for, and the Exploitation of, the Petroleum
Resources, and Certain Other Resources, of the Continental Shelf of Australia and of Certain
Territories of the Commonwealth and of Certain Other Submerged Land, Oct. 6, 1967, pmbl.
[hereinafter 1967 Agreement].
17. Id. pt. II, para. 2.
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eral importance, such as shipping, navigation, external affairs; taxes,
lighthouses, fisheries, communications, and foreign and interstate
trade.18 All legal processes were duplicated for the federal and state
governments so that no legal vacuum existed over the offshore areas.19
Under the 1967 Agreement, offshore energy development was
separated into exploration and development stages. The offshore ar-
eas were divided into a system of graticular blocks, which varied in
size from twenty-five to thirty square miles. A company could apply
for a six-year permit, which would allow for exploratory drilling
within a given area during that time.20 Although the permit was re-
newable for five-year periods, a company was required to surrender
one-half of its exploration area upon each renewal.21 The maximum
area that a company could hold for exploration was 400 blocks, or
10,000 square miles.22
Once petroleum was discovered, a company had to inform the
designated authority and apply for a production license. One graticu-
lar block had to be identified as the central block of a nine-block loca-
tion. The company would then nominate five out of the nine blocks
for a production license. It was required to pay a ten percent royalty
on the value of the well-head production, with sixty percent given to
the state and forty percent to the Commonwealth. 23 The remaining
tracts would be retendered. The company discovering the petroleum
was given the first option for purchasing licenses on the surrendered
tracts at the rate of the highest bidder.24 Alternatively, the company
could take a production license on more than five blocks and pay an
override royalty to the state at the rate of one to two and one-half
18. Id. pt. III.
19. See Crommelin, supra note 3, at 478-83; Thompson, supra note 9; Dakin, supra note
13; Treby, supra note 14; R.D. Lumb, The Offshore Petroleum Agreement and Legislation, 41
AuSTL. L.J. 453 (1968); C.W. Harders, Australia's Offshore Petroleum Legislation: A Survey of
Its Constitutional Background and Its Federal Features, 6 MEL. U. L. REv. 415 (1968); John
L. Taylor, The Settlement of Disputes Between Federal and State Governments Concerning Off-
shore Petroleum Resources: Accommodation or Adjudication, 11 HARV. INT'L L.J. 358, 378-83
(1970); Andrew R. Thompson, Australian Petroleum Legislation and the Canadian Experience,
6 MELB. U. L. REv. 370 (1968); Colin Warbrick, Comment, Offshore Petroleum Exploitation
in Federal Systems: Canadian and Australian Action, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 501, 508-13
(1968).
20. Thompson, supra note 9, at 9-13.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.; Crommelin, supra note 3, at 479-83.
24. Thompson, supra note 9, at 9-13; Crommelin, supra note 3, at 479-83.
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percent on all blocks. 25
The 1967 Agreement was not legally enforceable and therefore
relied solely upon the goodwill of the parties. 26 The agreement could
not be repealed or amended, nor could any action be taken without
the unanimous consent of all parties.27 The parties were required to
enact legislation implementing the agreement. 28 The Common-
wealth's bill was introduced on October 18, 1967, and received royal
assent on November 22, 1967.29 The Commonwealth Senate enacted
the bill on the condition that a select committee be established to in-
vestigate "whether the constitutional conception underlying the legis-
lation is consistent with the proper constitutional responsibility of the
Commonwealth and the States." ' 30
A. Offshore Jurisdiction Under Australia's Seas and Submerged
Lands Act
Despite the 1967 Agreement's express purpose to avoid constitu-
25. Thompson, supra note 9, at 9-13; Crommelin, supra note 3, at 478-83; see also Dakin,
supra note 13; Treby, supra note 14; Lumb, supra note 19; Taylor, supra note 19, at 378-83;
Thompson, supra note 19; Warbrick, supra note 19, at 508-13. After the 1973 increase in the
price of petroleum, the value of the economic rents from offshore development also increased
dramatically. Only the Commonwealth benefited from this increase. Section 90 of the Austra-
lian Constitution grants the Commonwealth exclusive authority over customs, excise, and
bounties. AUSTL. CONST. § 90. This prohibited the states from taking the increase in eco-
nomic rents from licensees as either an excise or sales tax.
Not being subject to the same limitations as the states, the Commonwealth imposed an
excise duty on crude oil ("Crude Oil Levy"). This excise constituted the total increase in
economic rents and made the price of Australian crude commensurate with world oil prices.
The revenues went entirely to the Commonwealth. Furthermore, the Commonwealth main-
tained the royalty at the pre-1973 level by requiring that the Crude Oil Levy be subtracted
from the market well-head value. By 1981, however, the states were able to benefit from these
revenues through general revenue sharing grants. Richard Cullen, Canada and Australia: A
Federal Parting of the Ways, 18 FED. L. REV. 53, 69-71 (1989) [hereinafter Cullen, Canada
and Australia]; see also Richard Cullen, Bass Strait Revenue Raising, 6 J. ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 213, 223-26 (1988) [hereinafter Cullen, Bass Straight].
26. 1967 Agreement, supra note 16, pt. IV, cl. 26 ("The Governments acknowledge that
this Agreement is not intended to create legal relationships justiciable in a Court of Law but
declare that the Agreement shall be construed and given effect to by the parties in all respects
according to the true meaning and spirit thereof.").
27. Id. pt. IV, cl. 25 (stating that the 1967 Agreement "shall not be capable of being
varied or revoked or of being determined by any Government except by agreement between all
of the Governments for the time being parties thereto").
28. Id. pt. III.
29. Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967, No. 118, 1967 AUSTL. AcTs P. 862,
amended by Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1968, No. 1, 1968 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1; see
Crommein, supra note 3, at 488.
30. K. Beauchamp et al., Jurisdictional Problems in Canada's Offshore, 11 ALTA. L.
REV. 431, 455 (1973); Thompson, supra note 9, at 27-28.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
tional litigation, the offshore jurisdiction question emerged tangen-
tially in 1969. In Bonser v. La Macchia,31 the defendant was
prosecuted for violating the Commonwealth Fisheries Act of 1952,
which applied to "Australian waters beyond territorial limits."'3 2 The
defendant, whose offense occurred six and one-half miles offshore, al-
leged that the Commonwealth lacked jurisdiction to prosecute be-
cause "Australian waters beyond territorial limits" only consisted of
the three mile territorial sea.a3 The Australian High Court held that
the defendant's offense occurred within Australian waters.34
Several justices addressed the issue of jurisdiction over the terri-
torial sea. Chief Justice Barwick held that the territorial limits of
Australia were restricted to Australia's land mass.3 5 In doing so, he
relied on the 1876 decision of Regina v. Keyn, 36 which held that com-
mon law jurisdiction ended at the low-water mark.37 Chief Justice
Barwick asserted that international recognition of the territorial sea
occurred sometime after the Keyn decision. The Crown initially
claimed that the territorial sea off the coast of Australia was owned by
the United Kingdom.3 When Australia attained self-government in
1931, the Crown's rights in the territorial sea were granted to the
Commonwealth. 39 While Chief Justice Barwick acknowledged that
some nineteenth century law officers declared that the Crown held the
territorial sea in right of the colonies, he found these opinions errone-
ous.4° Nevertheless, Chief Justice Barwick ultimately held that the
Commonwealth lacked jurisdiction over fisheries within the territorial
sea.4
1
Justice Windeyer held that the grant of state authority over fish-
eries in the territorial sea under the Commonwealth Fisheries Act was
not premised on any constitutional grounds. 42 Rather, he stated, it
was based on "a misconception as to the areas of Commonwealth and
State power which has unquestionably been prevalent for a long time,
31. 122 C.L.R. 177 (1970) (Austl.).
32. Id.; Fisheries Act 1952-1966, No. 7, § 4, 1955 AUSTL. ACTS P. 864.
33. Bonser, 122 C.L.R. at 177-78.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 184-89.
36. 2 Ex. D. 63 (1876) (Eng.).
37. Id
38. Bonser, 122 C.L.R. at 187.
39. Id. at 189.
40. Id. at 192, 197.
41. Id. at 198.
42. Id. at 232.
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or simply as a matter of policy."' 43 Justice Windeyer found that the
colonies never possessed jurisdiction over the territorial sea,44 and
that "[s]overeign rights in respect to these waters resided in the Impe-
rial Crown.145 When Australia became a nation, the Commonwealth
"succeeded to the Imperial rights and interests formerly existing in
and under the territorial waters." 46 Nevertheless, Justice Windeyer
decided that the states' authority to act for "peace, order and good
government" permitted state regulation of the fisheries within the ter-
ritorial sea.4
7
Justice Kitto maintained the minority position in Bonser and
questioned the validity of Keyn.4s He stated that if the issue of juris-
diction over the territorial sea were before the High Court, "this
Court should hold ... that the seaward boundaries of the States are
set by the three mile rule."'49
In 1971, the Senate Select Committee issued its report on the
constitutional conception underlying the 1967 Agreement.50 The re-
port arrived at the following conclusions:
(1) The constitutional conception underlying the legislation is in-
consistent with what should be the proper constitutional relation-
ship between the Parliament and the executive.
(2) In the context of broad constitutional responsibilities there is
a challenge to the exercise of the functions of Parliament in the
conception of uniform legislation drafted by the executive arms of
the seven Australian Governments being presented to the Parlia-
ments as afait accompli requiring formal legislative approval. This
cannot be regarded as strictly inconsistent with the "proper consti-
tutional responsibilities" of the Commonwealth and the States as
the power always lies with the Parliaments of the Commonwealth
and the States to reject or amend the legislation.
(3) The Committee does not regard the legislation as being incon-
sistent with the "proper responsibilities" of the Commonwealth
and the States because, as a result of the decision to avoid litigation
43. Bonser, 122 C.L.R. at 232.
44. Id. at 222.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 223.
47. Id. at 225-26.
48. Bonser, 122 C.L.R. at 201-02.
49. Id. at 202.
50. REPORT FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMM. ON OFF-SHORE PETROLEUM RE-
SOURCES (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1971) [hereinafter SEN-
ATE SELECT REPORT], cited in Beauchamp et al., supra note 30, at 452 n.89.
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which would have resolved the matter, it cannot say what is the
measure of those proper constitutional responsibilities.
(4) The Committee considers that, notwithstanding the advan-
tages to the national interest which the legislation and its underly-
ing conception has produced, the larger national interest is not
served by leaving unresolved and uncertain the extent of State and
Commonwealth authority in the territorial sea-bed and the Conti-
nental Shelf.51
In its report, the Senate Select Committee commented on the
High Court's decision in Bonser.52 The Committee stated that the
issue of jurisdiction had been clarified "so that it may now be argued
that the Commonwealth has, and has always had, legislative power
over the natural resources of the territorial sea-bed and Continental
Shelf." a53 Nevertheless, the report concluded:
[T]he constitutional authority of the Commonwealth and the
States in respect of the natural resources of the offshore seabed is
still a matter of contention and doubt. Whatever the illumination
which recent decisions have given to the areas of darkness, there
would appear to be no way of resolving the issue of authority with-
out an actual decision of the High Court.
54
Before the release of the final report, the Gorton Liberal Party
introduced a bill to declare Commonwealth sovereignty over the terri-
torial sea and continental shelf. The bill lapsed in 1972 as a result of
opposition. 5 When the Labor Party government returned to power
in 1972, Prime Minister Whitlam and other radical nationalists, who
viewed the federal system as an impediment to the realization of their
economic and social policies, reintroduced the Gorton bill.56 The
Seas and Submerged Lands Act ("SSLA") was subsequently enacted
into law in 1973. 57 The SSLA implemented the Conventions on the
Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf and declared Commonwealth
51. SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 50; see also Beauchamp et al., supra note 30, at
455; Rowland J. Harrison, The Offshore Mineral Resources Agreement in the Maritime Prov-
inces, 4 DALHOUSIE L.J. 245, 262-63 (1978).
52. SENATE SELECT REPORT, supra note 50.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. R.D. LUMB, THE LAW OF THE SEA AND AUSTRALIAN OFF-SHORE AREAS 214 (2d
ed. 1978).
56. Id.; see also W.G. MCMINN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA 195
(1979).
57. Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973, No. 161, 1973 AUSTL. AcTs P. 763.
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jurisdiction over the territorial sea and continental shelf"' In 1974,
the states brought suit challenging the SSLA.
The Australian High Court found the SSLA constitutional in
New South Wales v. Commonwealth59 and determined that state juris-
diction ended at the low-water mark.60 The High Court found that
rights over the territorial sea had been held by the Crown in right of
Great Britain and were never granted to the colonies.61 Even if the
colonies once possessed rights over the territorial sea, these rights,
which were an attribute of external sovereignty, were surrendered to
the Commonwealth at federation. 62 In addition, according to the
High Court, decisions by the United States and Canadian Supreme
Courts confirmed that external sovereignty established jurisdiction
over offshore submerged lands.63 Since international law recognized
continental shelf rights, the Commonwealth could claim these rights
as an external sovereign. 64 Finally, the implementation of the Con-
ventions on the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf, under the
SSLA, established Commonwealth jurisdiction over these areas.65
The High Court held that the SSLA was a valid exercise of the Com-
monwealth's external affairs authority under section 5 1(xxix) of the
Australian Constitution.
66
III. TERRITORIAL SEA JURISDICTION AND DOMINION RIGHTS
The Australian High Court majority in New South Wales deter-
58. Section 6 of the SSLA declares that "the sovereignty in respect of the territorial sea,
and in respect of the airspace over it and in respect of its bed and subsoil, is vested in and
exercisable by the Crown in right of the Commonwealth." Id § 6. The Governor-General can
declare the limits of the territorial sea, as long as the declaration is "not inconsistent with the
Territorial Sea Convention." Id. Section 11 states that "the sovereign rights of Australia as a
coastal State in respect of the continental shelf of Australia, for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources, are vested in and exercisable by the Crown in right of the
Commonwealth." Id. § 11. The Governor-General can prescribe the continental shelf limits
of Australia, as long as they are not inconsistent with the Continental Shelf Convention. Id.
59. 135 C.L.R. 337 (1975) (Austl.).
60. There was no single majority opinion in the case. References in this Article to the
majority opinion refer to Chief Justice Barwick's opinion at 135 C.L.R. at 366-71. Chief Jus-
tice Barwick wrote the leading opinion in the case. This means that, of the majority, his
opinion stated the Commonwealth's case most comprehensively. See Cullen, Canada and Aus-
tralia, supra note 25, at 73 n.108.
61. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 368-71.
62. Id. at 372.
63. Id. at 373-74.
64. Id. at 374-75.
65. Id. at 360-66.
66. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 360-66.
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mined that the Crown held jurisdiction and dominion over the territo-
rial sea, and that the Crown never surrendered its rights to the
colonies.67 According to the High Court, colonial grants were limited
to land territory above the low-water mark. 68 The 1855 Imperial stat-
ute, which surrendered the Crown's wastelands to the colonies when
they achieved self-government, did not include the territorial sea. 69
The High Court found that the 1876 decision of Regina v. Keyn 70
confirmed the limitations imposed upon colonies regarding offshore
jurisdiction. 71 In addition, the High Court maintained that no colo-
nial ministers advised the Crown on matters regarding the territorial
sea,72 and that nineteenth century law officers were wrong in recog-
nizing colonial jurisdiction over the territorial sea.73
According to the High Court, even if the colonies had possessed
sovereign and proprietary rights over the territorial sea, they relin-
quished these rights upon the establishment of the Australian Com-
monwealth in 1901. 74 The territorial sea was an attribute of external
sovereignty, and all aspects of external sovereignty were surrendered
to the Commonwealth at federation. This was confirmed by the emer-
gence of Australia as an independent nation in the twentieth
century. 75
The majority's position regarding the territorial sea was dubi-
ous. 76 In the nineteenth century, the Crown held sovereignty and do-
minion over the territorial sea. When the Australian colonies attained
self-government, the Crown's rights in the territorial sea passed to the
colonies. The High Court erred in relying on Keyn, as it was an
anomaly, addressing only admiralty jurisdiction. 77 Colonial ministers
did advise the Crown on matters affecting the territorial sea, and nine-
teenth century law officers correctly acknowledged colonial jurisdic-
tion over the territorial sea. The Australian states did not surrender
67. Id. at 367-69.
68. Id. at 368-69.
69. Id. at 369-70.
70. 2 Ex. D. 63 (1876) (Eng.).
71. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 368-70.
72. Id. at 365, 370.
73. Id. at 371.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 374-75.
76. The minority opinions of Justices Gibbs and Stephen explain more cogently the status
of the territorial sea under the Australian Constitution. See New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at
382-416 (Gibbs, J.), 416-58 (Stephen, J.).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 115-37.
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their jurisdiction over the territorial sea to the Commonwealth upon
federation.
A. British Recognition of the Territorial Sea
English jurists of the seventeenth through twentieth centuries
recognized that the Crown possessed jurisdiction and property rights
over the sea, seabed, and subsoil.78 They made no distinction between
the Crown's imperium and dominion over offshore areas. 79
1. British Recognition in the Nineteenth Century
In the nineteenth century, the Crown focused its offshore claims
on the territorial sea.80 Great Britain championed a three-mile terri-
torial sea throughout this period, as evidenced by international agree-
ments,8 1 domestic legislation, 82 and the writings of British publicists.83
British courts also recognized Crown rights in the three-mile territo-
rial sea.
In several early cases, the British High Court of Admiralty ex-
pressly acknowledged the three-mile territorial sea.8 4 In the 1821 case
of Blundell v. Catterall,85 Justice Holyrod affirmed the King's prop-
erty rights "in the main sea itself, adjacent to his dominions. ' '86 In
the 1828 case of Gifford v. Lord Yarborough,s7 Justice Best referred to
78. For a complete overview of the development of the concept of the territorial sea, see
D.P. O'Connell, The Juridicial Nature of the Territorial Sea, 1971 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 303.
79. D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 535 (1982).
80. See infra text accompanying notes 329-344.
81. The Fisheries Convention of 1818, which settled the United States-British conflict
over fishing rights off Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, barred United States fishermen from
fishing three miles off the shores of Canadian provinces. In 1839, Britain and France con-
cluded a fishing agreement, which precluded each from fishing three miles from the other's
shore. In 1855, a United States-British claims commission invalidated the British seizure of
the United States schooner Washington in the Bay of Fundy, on the ground that the ship was
on the high seas and not within the three-mile territorial sea of Nova Scotia. SAYRE A.
SWARTZRAUBER, THE THREE MILE LIMIT OF THE TERRITORIAL SEAS 51-88 (1972).
82. In 1868, British county courts were granted admiralty jurisdiction over maritime af-
fairs occurring three miles from shore. In 1876, Britain repealed all of its hovering legislation
and established a three-marine league custom zone for British vessels and a one-marine league
(three mile) custom zone for foreign vessels. Id. at 66-71.
83. Sir Robert Phillimore and Sir Edward Creasy asserted that jurisdiction over the
three-mile territorial sea was based on the cannon shot rule. Later British publicists, such as
Sir Travis Twill, William Edward Hall, and Thomas Joseph Lawrence, accepted the three-mile
rule on its merits. Id. at 68-71.
84. Id. at 60-61.
85. 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (P.C. 1821) (Eng.).
86. Id. at 1199.
87. 130 Eng. Rep. 1023 (H.L. 1828) (Eng.).
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the fundum maris as the property of the King.88 A year later, in
Benest v. Pipon,89 Lord Wynford, relying on Blundell and Gifford,
stated that the sea "is the property of the King and so is the land
beneath it."90
Several mid-nineteenth century British court decisions recog-
nized the Crown's rights in the three-mile territorial sea. The 1854
case of Attorney-General v. Chambers91 discussed the ownership of
coal seams that were contiguous to the seashore. Lord Cranworth
stated, "The Crown is clearly in such a case, according to all the au-
thorities, entitled to the 'litus maris' as well as to the soil of the sea
itself adjoining the costs [sic] of England. '9 2
In 1856, in The "Leda, " portions of the Merchant Shipping Act
of 1854, 93 which addressed salvage and stranded vessels within the
limits of the United Kingdom, came under scrutiny.94 The "'Leda"
involved salvage services rendered to a vessel within the three-mile
territory. Dr. Lushington stated that the expression "within the lim-
its of the United Kingdom," as used in the Merchant Shipping Act of
1854, could only mean "the land of the United Kingdom and three
miles from shore." 95
In 1856, the arbitrator in The Cornwall Mines Case96 held that
the Duchy of Cornwall owned the mines to the low-water mark, while
the mines beyond the low-water mark belonged to the Crown.97 The
arbitrator further found that the Crown's right to the seabed was a
"territorial right," and that the seabed was "part of the Realm."98
The 1860 case of General Iron Screw Collier Co. v. Schurmann99
addressed the issue of whether the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854
88. Id. at 1024.
89. 12 Eng. Rep. 243 (P.C. 1829) (Eng.).
90. Id. at 246.
91. 43 Eng. Rep. 486 (P.C. 1854) (Eng.).
92. Id. at 489. According to Black's Law Dictionary, "litus mars" is the "sea-shore."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 934 (6th ed. 1990).
93. 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 104, § 458 (1854) (U.K.); see also O'Connell, supra note 78, at 367.
94. The "Leda", 166 Eng. Rep. 1007 (P.C. 1856) (Eng.).
95. Id. at 1008.
96. 21 & 22 Vict., ch. 109 (1856) (U.K.). The Cornwall Mines Case involved a dispute
between the Crown and the Duchy of Cornwall as to who owned the mines located three miles
offshore. O'Connell, supra note 78, at 324.
97. O'Connell, supra note 78, at 324.
98. Id.; G.V. LA FOREST, NATURAL RESOURCES AND PUBLIC PROPERTY UNDER THE
CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 94, 98 (1969); Cecil J.B. Hurst, Whose Is the Bed of the Sea?, 4
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 34-36 (1923).
99. 70 Eng. Rep. 712 (P.C. 1980) (Eng.).
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covered the collision between a British and foreign ship within three
miles of the coast of Great Britain.1°° Sir Page Wood stated that
"every country may, by the common law of nations, legitimately exer-
cise jurisdiction over that portion of the high seas which lies within
the distance of three miles from its shores."10'
In Gammell v. Commissioners of Woods and Forest,0 2 an 1861
case, the court adjudicated whether the Crown held exclusive rights
to the salmon fishery off the coast of Scotland.103 According to Lord
Wensleydale,
It would be hardly possible to extend [fishing] seaward beyond the
distance of three miles, which by the acknowledged law of nations
belongs to the coast of the country, that which is under the domin-
ion of the country by being within cannon range, and so capable of
being kept in perpetual possession.'°4
In Gann v. Free Fishers of Whitstable,1 5 an 1865 case, Ex-Lord
Chancellor Chelsford stated that "the three mile limit depends upon a
rule of international law, by which every independent State is consid-
ered to have territorial property and jurisdiction in the seas which
wash their coasts within the assumed distance of a cannon-shot from
the shore."'10 6 In 1866, Justice Blackburn, in Ipswich Dock Commis-
sioners v. Overseers of St. Peter, 10 7 referred to the sea as "a part of the
great waste, both land and water, of which the king is lord."'' 08
In 1868, in Duchess of Sutherland v. Watson,'0 9 the Court of Ses-
sion considered rights over the mussel scallops on Scotland's fore-
shore. 10 Although it was unnecessary to address the Crown's interest
below the low-water mark, several of the justices concluded that the
seabed adjoining the coast belonged to the Crown."'
The British courts, following Hale's doctrine," 2 determined that
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also SWARTZRAUBER, supra note 81, at 68.
102. 3 H.L. Rep. 419 (1859) (Eng.).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 465-66.
105. 11 Eng. Rep. 1305 (P.C. 1865) (Eng.).
106. Id. at 1316.
107. 7 B. & S. 310 (1866) (Eng.).
108. Id. at 344.
109. 6 Sess. Cas. 199 (1868) (Scot.).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 209, 213.
112. Hale stated, "In this sea the King of England hath a double right, viz. a right of
jurisdiction which he ordinarily exerciseth by his admiral, and a right of propriety or owner-
ship." See O'Connell, supra note 78, at 362.
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the Crown held property rights in the sea, seabed, and subsoil. D.P.
O'Connell, an esteemed scholar, noted that these cases affirmed that
"all the writers of the law of England agree in this, that as the King is
Lord of the sea, that flows around our coast, and also owner of all the
land to which no individual has acquired the right by occupation." ' 1 3
This position was supported by thirty of the thirty-six writers who
addressed the issue of the territorial sea from 1836 through 1876.114
Consequently, until the latter part of the nineteenth century, the dom-
inant view was that the Crown's jurisdiction over the territorial sea
was based on the Crown's proprietary interests.
2. Regina v. Keyn
In the 1876 case of Regina v. Keyn, 1 5 the Court of Crown Cases
Reserved broke with judicial precedent by refusing to acknowledge
any Crown rights, either proprietary or sovereign, in the territorial
sea. 116 In Keyn, a German steamer, the Franconia, ran into a British
steamer, the Strathclyde, two and one-half miles off the English shore,
killing a British citizen. The captain of the Franconia, Fernindad
Keyn, a German national, was convicted of manslaughter.' 17 His
conviction was overturned by a vote of 7-6 in the Court of Crown
Cases Reserved. 18 Specifically, the court held that the Central Crimi-
nal Court lacked jurisdiction over offenses committed on the high seas
by foreign nationals, even if the offenses were committed within three
miles of the English coast.' 19
The Court of Crown Cases Reserved first examined the nature of
the common law and admiralty jurisdiction. 120 The court found that
the criminal jurisdiction of the common law courts was limited to the
county, which included waters inter fauces terra,121 or to the realm,
113. Id. at 365 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 327; see also Price Daniel, Sovereignty and Ownership in the Marginal Sea, 3
BAYLOR L. REV. 243, 267-311 (1951).





120. The opinion referred to is that of Justice Cockburn, which was joined by Justices
Pollack and Field. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. at 159-239.
121. According to the United States Supreme Court, "[Wlaters 'inter fauces terrae' or
landward of an opening 'between the jaws of land' could be subject to the jurisdiction of the
littoral county rather than the Admiral if the jaws were close enough to satisfy a somewhat
ambiguous line-of-sight test." United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89, 92 (1986).
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which ended at the coastal low-water mark. 122 Admiralty jurisdic-
tion, which included offenses committed on the seas outside of the
realm, had been transferred by statute to the county courts. 23 Since
Keyn's offense occurred outside of county boundaries, the Crown had
to demonstrate admiralty jurisdiction over the nature or location of
the offense in order to legitimize the Central Criminal Court's
jurisdiction.
124
In examining the nature of the offense, the Court of Crown Cases
Reserved found that admiralty jurisdiction, with the exception of
piracy, was restricted to offenses committed aboard British vessels,
which were considered an extension of British territory. 125 Since this
crime was committed by a German national aboard a German ship,
no admiralty jurisdiction existed over the offense. 126
The Court of Crown Cases Reserved, in reviewing the location of
the offense, also rejected the earlier position espoused by English ju-
rists that the "bed of the sea is part of the realm of England and part
of the territorial possession of the Crown." 127 The court held that
since there was no historic claim over the territorial sea, the Crown's
jurisdiction had to rest on international law.128 Although the court
acknowledged the emerging principle of the territorial sea in interna-
tional law, it also noted that the publicists disagreed "in the practical
application of the rule, in respect of the particular distance, and also
in the still more essential particular of the character and degree of
sovereignty and dominion to be exercised."' 29 In light of these uncer-
tainties, the court determined that Britain could exercise jurisdiction
over the territorial sea only through an act of Parliament.130 Legisla-
tion pertaining to international relations, customs, fisheries, and navi-
gation was insufficient.' 3 ' The court concluded that since Parliament
never formally extended the Crown's jurisdiction over the territorial
sea, the Central Criminal Court lacked jurisdiction to try Keyn for his
122. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. at 161-62.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 168-69.
126. Id.
127. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. at 195; see also O'Connell, supra note 78, at 303-24.
128. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. at 195; John McEvoy, Atlantic Canada: The Constitutional Offshore
Regime, 8 DALHOUSIE L.J. 284-92 (1984).
129. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. at 191.
130. Id. at 193, 204.
131. Id. at 214.
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offense. 132
The minority in Keyn accepted the proposition that international
law was the received law of England.1 33 The minority asserted that
the concept of the territorial sea in international law, which was es-
tablished by the "common agreement or acquiescence of jurists," ena-
bled nations to exercise jurisdiction three miles seaward from the low-
water mark. 134 This three-mile zone was "a part of the territory of
the adjacent nation, as much and as completely as if it were land,"'
135
and constituted the nation's "territorial waters, subject to its rights of
property, dominion and sovereignty."' 36 Thus, English criminal law
applied to the three-mile zone, even in the absence of a statute. Admi-
ralty jurisdiction, which was residual in nature, encompassed national
territory that was not part of the realm or the county. Since Keyn's
offense occurred within three miles of the English shore, admiralty
jurisdiction existed over the offense. Consequently, the minority rea-
soned that the Central Criminal Court, as the successor of admiralty
jurisdiction, possessed jurisdiction to try the offense. 137
Two 1877 cases affirmed the Keyn rationale. Both addressed dis-
putes in the territorial sea and were decided by several of the dissent-
ing justices in Keyn. In the first case, Harris v. Owners of
Franconia,138 Lord Coleridge stated that the rationale of Keyn "is,
that, for the purpose of jurisdiction (except where under special cir-
cumstances and in special Acts parliament has thought fit to extend
it), the territory of England and the sovereignty of the Queen stops at
the low-water mark." 39 Justice Denman stated that, according to
Keyn, "the moment you get beyond [the] low-water mark you get be-
yond the jurisdiction within which the Queen's writs run."' 14
In the second case, Blackpool Pier Co. v. Fylde Union,'4' the
court discussed the extent of the realm as it relates to the imposition
132. Id. at 231.
133. Justice Brett authored the minority opinion to which this Article refers. Id. at 124-
49.
134. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. at 142-43.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 145-46.
138. 2 C.P.D. 173 (1877) (Eng.).
139. Id. at 177 (emphasis added); see also New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 135
C.L.R. 337, 431 (1975) (Austl.) (Stephen, J.) (Justice Stephen stated that "with the case of
Harris v. Owners of Franconia, as subsequently understood, began what I regard as the later
misinterpretation of Keyn's case.").
140. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 432 (Stephen, J.) (quoting Harris, 2 C.P.D. at 178).
141. 36 L.T.R. 251 (1877) (Eng.).
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of parish taxes. 142 Lord Coleridge, together with Justice Grove, held
that a pier extending 500 feet beyond the low-water mark was outside
of the realm, and thus not taxable. 43 While both Harris and Black-
pool Pier Co. examined the geographical limits of the common law
courts' jurisdiction, they did not address Crown ownership of such
territory. '"4
Responding to the Keyn decision, the British Parliament enacted
the Territorial Waters Jurisdictional Act 45 ("TWJA") in 1878. John
Bassett Moore stated that Parliament "considered it imperative to
adopt legislation nullifying the decision's effect for the future besides
declaring it wrong as to the past."' 46 The TWJA restored the
Crown's rights "as they always existed."14 7 By enacting the TWJA,
Parliament extended admiralty jurisdiction to all offenses committed
by foreigners on the territorial sea. Territorial waters were defined in
the TWJA as one marine league seaward from the low-water mark off
Great Britain and the British provinces. 4
8
Lord Coleridge, referring to the TWJA in Regina v. Dudley and
Stephens, 49 stated, "[T]he opinion of the minority in the Franconia
Case ... has been since not only enacted but declared by Parliament
to have been always the law.' 50 Similarly, the Earl of Halsbury,
L.C., in Carr v. Fracis, Times, and Co.,15' held that the TWJA re-
versed the Keyn decision and "affirmed in terms that the judgment of
the majority of the judges in Reg. v. Keyn was not the law of
England."15
2
The Keyn case, which was an anomaly, rested on a very narrow
foundation. Keyn addressed the issue of the Central Criminal Court's
admiralty jurisdiction, and not the Crown's property rights over off-
shore lands. In 1891, the United States Supreme Court, in
Manchester v. Massachusetts, 53 noted that in Keyn "the question was
not as to the extent of the dominion of Great Britain over the open sea
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 433 (Stephen, J.).
145. 41 & 42 Vict. (1878) (U.K.), cited in McEvoy, supra note 128, at 297 n.58.
146. See Daniel, supra note 114, at 282 (citing 7 MOORE'S COLLECTED PAPERS 294).
147. Territorial Waters Jurisdictional Act, ch. 73, § 2.
148. Id.; see also McEvoy, supra note 128, at 297-98.
149. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (Eng.).
150. Id. at 281.
151. 85 L.T.R. 144 (1901) (Eng.).
152. Id. at 146.
153. 139 U.S. 240 (1891).
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adjacent to the coast, but only as to the extent of the existing jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Admiralty in England over offenses committed on
the open sea."' 5 4 The United States Supreme Court further stated,
"We think it must be regarded as established that, as between nations,
the minimum limit of the territorial jurisdiction of a nation over tide-
waters is a marine league from its coast."155
O'Connell found the scope of the Keyn decision very limited, and
he asserted that the case's rationale was that common law jurisdiction
was limited to the realm.15 6 The realm, which defined a court's juris-
diction, included county waters and the areas to the low-water
mark. 157 The realm did not define the extent of the Crown's property,
which amounted to more than the sum of the counties.158 The territo-
rial sea was part of the Crown's lands, but not part of the realm.5 9
According to O'Connell, "[T]he true ratio decidendi in R. v. Keyn was
that the common law jurisdiction terminated at the low-water mark,
and that nothing more fell to be decided, although it is clear that a
majority of the Court thought they were deciding more."16°
3. British Recognition in the Twentieth Century
The British courts soon abandoned the Keyn rationale and re-
turned to a proprietary view of the territorial sea.' 6 ' Between 1891
and 1916, four cases recognized the Crown's ownership of the seabed
of the territorial sea. In these cases, the Privy Council merged the
feudal doctrine of Crown lands with international law regarding the
territorial sea. In 1891, in Lord Advocate v. Clyde Navigation Trust-
ees,' 62 the Privy Council barred Clyde Navigation from disposing of
dredgings in the Long Loch channel, finding that the Crown held title
to the seabed of the loch and to the seabed three miles from the
coast. 163 The court determined that "there is no distinction in legal
character between the Crown's right in the foreshore, in tidal and
navigable rivers, and in the bed of the sea within three miles of the
154. Id. at 257.
155. Id. at 258.




160. Id. at 377.
161. LA FOREsr, supra note 98, at 95.
162. 19 R. 174 (Sess. 1891) (Scot.).
163. Id. at 177.
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shore."' 64 Further, the Crown's proprietary right was "a right which
may be the subject of trespass, and which may be vindicated like other
rights of property." 165
In 1900, the Privy Council decided another case involving a dis-
pute over the ownership of coal in the seabed beyond the low-water
mark, The Lord Advocate v. Wemyss.' 66 In Wemyss, Lord Watson
stated, "I see no reason to doubt that, by the law of Scotland, the
solum underlying the waters of the ocean, whether within the narrow
seas, or from the coast outward to the three-mile limit, and also the
minerals beneath it, are vested in the Crown."' 67
In the 1908 case of Lord Fitzhardinge v. Purcell,168 the Privy
Council again addressed this issue and upheld a lord's title to the fore-
shore of a navigable river, but found that the title was subject to the
public's right of fishing and navigation. 69 Justice Parker, comment-
ing on the nature of the land, stated that "[c]learly the bed of the sea,
at any rate for some distance, below the low water mark and the beds
of tidal navigable rivers, are, prima facie vested in the Crown ... " 1170
In 1916, in Secretary of State v. Chelikani Rama Rao,17 1 the
Privy Council determined the ownership of three small islands that
appeared within three miles of the coast of Madras between 1840 and
1860.172 The board, quoting statements from the aforementioned
cases, held that islands arising in the King's sea were the property of
the King.1 73 In criticism of Keyn, the board stated:
It should not be forgotten that Regina v. Keyn had reference on its
merits solely to the point as to the limits of Admiralty jurisdiction;
nothing else fell to be there decided. It was marked by an extreme
conflict of judicial opinion, and the judgment of the majority of the
Court was rested on the ground of there having been no jurisdic-
tion in former times in the Admiral to try offenses by foreigners on




166. 1900 App. Cas. 48 (P.C.) (Eng.).
167. Id. at 66.
168. 99 L.T.R. 155 (P.C. 1908) (Eng.).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 164.
171. 32 L.T.R. 652 (P.C. 1916) (Eng.).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 655.
174. Id. at 653.
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The Privy Council never formally resolved the issue of jurisdic-
tion over the territorial sea, even though it had opportunities to do so
in several Canadian fisheries cases. 175 The Privy Council was reluc-
tant to address the issue because the fisheries disputes could be de-
cided independently. In Attorney-General for British Columbia v.
Attorney-Generalfor Dominion of Canada,176 the Privy Council found
that the concept of the territorial sea was still in controversy. 177 The
Privy Council asserted that the status of the territorial sea should not
be decided by a municipal tribunal, but rather by an international
agreement. 178 In Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for
Quebec,179 the Privy Council reiterated its position, stating that "[ilt is
highly inexpedient, in a controversy of a purely municipal character
such as the present, to express an opinion on what is really a question
of public international law."' 80 However, the Privy Council inferred
that if rights in the territorial sea were recognized, the provinces
would hold such rights.'18 Furthermore, in the 1915 case of Attorney-
General of Southern Nigeria v. J. Holt & Co. (Liverpool),18 2 the Privy
Council referred to "the Crown as owner of the sea and its bed within
territorial limits, and/or foreshore."' 18 3
Politically, Great Britain continued to support and adhere to a
three-mile territorial sea after the Keyn decision. This was manifested
in international conventions, 1 4 domestic legislation,8 5 and interna-
tional pronouncements.186 In 1912, the International Court of Justice
175. See, e.g., Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Attorney-General for the Domin-
ion of Canada, 110 L.T.R. 484 (P.C. 1914); Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General
for Quebec, 124 L.T.R. 517 (P.C. 1921).
176. 110 L.T.R. at 484.
177. Id. at 490.
178. Id.
179. 124 L.T.R. at 517.
180. Id. at 521.
181. Roberts, Re Dominion Coal Co. LTD: Constitutional Law-Property Rights in the
Solum of Canada's Territorial Sea, 22 U. TORoNTo FAC. L. REv. 203, 207-09 (1964).
182. 1915 App. Cas. 599 (P.C.).
183. Id. at 611.
184. In 1882, Great Britain signed the North Sea Fisheries Convention, which recognized
each signatory's exclusive fishing rights within its territorial sea. A year later, Britain tri-
umphed in the Bering Sea Arbitration, which held that the United States possessed no rights to
hunt fur seals beyond its three-mile territorial sea. In 1911, an international convention pro-
hibited the signatories, including Britain, from hunting sea otters beyond their three-mile terri-
torial seas. SWARTZRAUBER, supra note 81, at 85-88, 117-18.
185. Id. at 86-88. Great Britain enacted the Seas Fisheries Act in 1883, criminalizing
fishing by foreign ships within Great Britain's three-mile territorial sea. Id.
186. See id. at 110-11. In 1905, Great Britain protested Uruguay's seizure of the British
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settled the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration by recognizing Great
Britain's and the United States' exclusive fishing rights within their
territorial seas. 187 These judicial and political events caused Captain
Swartzrauber, a leading commmentator, to conclude that "the great-
est years for the three-mile limit were those years from 1876 to
1926." 188
The codification of international law regarding the territorial sea
began in 1924 with a resolution of the League of Nations. 89 The
1930 Hague Codification Conference recognized that coastal states
possessed full sovereignty over their maritime belts, which included
the superadjacent air, the seabed, and the subsoil. I9° The conference
failed to produce a treaty because of a disagreement over the width of
the territorial sea.191 Nevertheless, after 1930, most nations recog-
nized that the sea was part of a nation's territory under customary
international law.' 92 The concept of the territorial sea was later codi-
fied in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea. 193
B. The Australian Territorial Sea
In the pre-federation nineteenth century, English common law
recognized the Crown's sovereignty and dominion over the territorial
sea. Justice Gibbs, in New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 9 4 empha-
sized that for the states to prevail in their offshore claims, they had to
demonstrate that "the right to the beneficial use of the land or its
proceeds [had] been appropriated to the colony and [were] subject to
the control of its legislature."' 95 Additionally, the states had to show
vessel, Agnes G. Donohoe, beyond Uruguay's three-mile territorial sea, and objected to claims
by Spain and Portugal to six-mile territorial seas. Id.
187. Id at 117-18.
188. Id. at 130.
189. Reference Re Mineral and Other Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf, 145
D.L.R.3d 9, 21 (1983) (Can.) [hereinafter Natural Resources Reference]. This League of Na-
tions resolution was referred to as the Progressive Codification of International Law and was
adopted by the Assembly on September 24, 1924. Progressive Codification of International
Law (1924), reprinted in LEAGUE OF NATIONS, THE PROGRESSIVE CODIFICATION OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1972).
190. Hague Codification Conference, League of Nations Doc. C.35 1(b) M. 145(b) 1930 V
(1930).
191. Natural Resources Reference, 145 D.L.R.3d at 22.
192. Id.
193. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CN 13/L.52 (1958).
See generally Eliezer Ereli, The Submerged Lands Act and the Geneva Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 61 TUL. L. REV. 555 (1967).
194. 135 C.L.R. 337 (1975) (Austl.).
195. Id. at 403 (Gibbs, J.).
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that "the right of dispositing of the land [could] only be exercised by
the Crown under the advice of the Ministers of that colony." 196 Jus-
tices Gibbs and Stephen, both in the minority, determined that juris-
diction over the territorial sea had been transferred to the colonies
prior to federation. 197
1. The Territorial Sea as a Crown Perogative Right
The territorial sea could be considered either a prerogative right
of the Crown or Crown property.198 Crown prerogative rights were
"the residue of the King's undefined powers after striking out those
which ha[d] been taken away by legislation or fall[en] by desue-
tude." 199 In New South Wales, Justice Jacobs noted:
[T]he King's rights in or over the open seas adhered to him as a ius
regale in right of his Crown of England. These rights adhered to
him by virtue of his kingship in its national rather than its feudal
aspect. The royal right was a prerogative recognized by the com-
mon law.., but it did not have its source in [the common] law.
2°°
Settlers of the Australian colonies adopted English law, including
the common law and sovereign prerogative rights.201 The Privy
Council, in Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver-
General of New Brunswick,20 2 held that "the prerogative of the Queen,
when it has not been expressly limited by local law or statute, is as
extensive in Her Majesty's colonial possessions as in Great Brit-
ain. ' 203 In the case of In re Batamen's Trust,20 4 the Privy Council
stated that "the Queen's prerogative is as extensive in New South
Wales as it is here in this county of Middlesex."20
5
196. Id. (Gibbs, J.). In 1919, Viscount Haldane had stated, "The Crown is one and indi-
visible throughout the Empire, and it acts in self-governing States on the initiative and advice
of its own Ministers in these States." Theodore v. Duncan, 26 C.L.R. 276, 282 (1919) (Austl.).
197. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 382-458.
198. Id. at 438-39 (Stephen, J.).
199. Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Butterworth and Co., 38 N.S.W. St. R.
195, 227 (1938).
200. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 487.
201. Butterworth and Co., 38 N.S.W. St. R. at 238 ("If this prerogative exists in England,
it existed also in this State immediately prior to the formation of the Commonwealth."); see
also The King v. Kidman, 20 C.L.R. 425, 435 (1915) (Austl.) ("It is clear law that in the case
of the British Colonies acquired by settlement the colonists carry their law with them so far as
it is applicable to the altered conditions.").
202. 1892 App. Cas. 437 (P.C.).
203. Id. at 441.
204. 15 L.R.-P.C. 355 (P.C. 1873).
205. Id. at 361.
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Initially, the Governor-General exercised the prerogative rights
of the Crown upon the advice of Imperial ministers.2°6 When the col-
onies attained self-government, they advised the Crown on preroga-
tive rights.20 7 In Toy v. Musgrove,208 the Victorian Supreme Court
noted that the Victorian Constitution established "a complete organic
system of responsible government coextensive as regards all the func-
tions of administration of affairs by Government." 2°9 The Australian
High Court, in South Australia v. Victoria,210 determined that once
self-government was attained, the Crown granted its executive au-
thority to the colonies, including the right to dispose of public
lands.211 In Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co. v. The King,212 the Privy
Council held that the grant of executive and legislative authority to
the colonies upon self-government included the Crown's prerogative
rights.213 The Crown's prerogative rights were not incorporated into
six separate codes of law. Rather, the rights became identical law
applicable to all six political entities unless specifically repealed by the
colonial legislatures. 214
2. The Territorial Sea as Crown Property
Alternatively, the territorial sea could have been considered
Crown property. 215 A fixed principle of English law stated that the
Crown was the proprietor of all land for which no subject could show
title. 216 When the Australian colonies were settled, this feudal princi-
ple was "extended to the land over sea."' 217 The Crown assumed con-
trol over Australian land, which was considered Crown property, and
held title to it in right of the colonies. There was no transfer of such
title to the Crown in right of the United Kingdom. This could only be
accomplished by a specific overt act.218
The Crown and the colonies disputed the control of Australian
206. Municipality of Randwick v. Rutledge, 102 C.L.R. 54, 71 (1959) (Austl.).
207. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 404 (Gibbs, J.), 438-40 (Stephen, J.).
208. 14 V.L.R. 349 (1888) (Vict.).
209. Id. at 386; see also Butterworth and Co., 38 N.S.W. St. R. at 241-42.
210. 12 C.L.R. 667 (1911) (Austl.).
211. Id. at 710.
212. [1916] 1 App. Cas. 566 (P.C.).
213. Id. at 585-87; see also Butterworth and Co., 38 N.S.W. St. R. at 242-43.
214. Butterworth and Co., 38 N.S.W. St. R. at 239-40.
215. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 439 (Stephen, J.).
216. Id. (Stephen, J.)
217. Id. (Stephen, J.) (quoting Williams v. Attorney-General for New South Wales, 16
C.L.R. 404 (1913) (N.S.W.)).
218. Williams, 16 C.L.R. at 442. Justice Isaacs stated, "It is a mere truism to say that the
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territory. 219 Before 1831, the Governor-General administered and
disposed of colonial lands upon the advice of the colonial office. The
English government changed its policy in 1831. Beginning in 1831,
Crown lands could only be disposed of by auction, after a minimum
bid was established. The notice declaring this policy stated that "all
the lands in the Colony not hitherto granted and not appropriated for
public purposes will be put up for sale."'220 Land already appropri-
ated for public service was reserved.221
The Crown retained the right to dispose of colonial lands. The
preamble to the Colonial Act of 1836222 ("Colonial Act") stated that
colonial governors were authorized "to grant and dispose of the waste
lands."223 The purpose of the Colonial Act was to validate territorial
grants made in the Governor's name instead of the Crown's. 224 Addi-
tionally, a Select Committee of the House of Commons was estab-
lished in 1836 to review the laws pertaining to colonial land
disposition. In 1840, the governor's report declared that Crown lands
were held in trust for the colonies and the British Empire
collectively. 2
2
In 1842, the Imperial Parliament passed a statute regulating the
sale of wastelands belonging to the Crown in the Australian colo-
nies.226 The statute defined crown wastelands as "any lands . . .
vested in Her Majesty ... which have not been already granted...
and which have not been dedicated and set apart for some public
use."' 227 Crown wastelands could only be conveyed or alienated by
sales complying with statutory regulations, and the proceeds from the
sales had to be used for public administration in the colonies. Impe-
rial officials dispersed the sale receipts and allocated half to defray the
cost of immigration. The colonies had no authority over the disposal
of Crown lands.228
title of the King to the lands of the Colony was in right of his Sovereighty of the Colony, in
other words in right of the Colony." Id.
219. Id. at 438-60; see also Municipality of Randwick v. Rutledge, 102 C.L.R. 54, 71-75
(1959) (Austl.).
220. Municipality of Randwick, 102 C.L.R. at 72.
221. Id. at 72-73.
222. 6 Win. IV, No. 16 (1836).
223. Id. pmbl.; see also Municipality of Randwick, 102 C.L.R. at 71.
224. Municipality of Randwick, 102 C.L.R. at 71.
225. Williams, 16 C.L.R. at 450.
226. 5 & 6 Vict., ch. 36 (1842) (U.K.).
227. Id. § 23; see also Williams, 16 C.L.R. at 424-25.
228. Williams, 16 C.L.R. at 424; Municipality of Randwick, 102 C.L.R. at 73.
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The Imperial Parliament amended the 1842 statute in 1846 to
allow the Crown to lease or license Crown lands for fourteen-year
periods. 229 The amendments also regulated the occupation of waste
lands, the ejection of intruders, and the protection of government of-
ficers.230 Yet, the colonies remained powerless over Crown lands,
even after subsequent amendments in 1850.231
3. Australian Colonial Authority over the Territorial Sea
The colonial Constitution Act of 1855 significantly changed colo-
nial authority over Crown lands. 232 The repeal of the 1842 statute
and the 1846 and 1850 amendments governing the disposal of Crown
lands released the colonies from tutelage regarding the administra-
tion, disposal, and use of Crown lands.233 Although the Australian
colonies did not acquire title to the Crown's waste lands held by the
Crown in right of the colonies, they gained control over Crown lands
as a matter of governmental administration. 234
When the colonies achieved self-government, the Crown's pre-
rogative or proprietary rights in the territorial sea came under colo-
nial jurisdiction. The Australian colonies were granted the beneficial
uses and proceeds derived from the territorial sea. In addition, colo-
nial legislators advised the Crown on the control and disposition of
rights in the territorial sea. 235
The majority in New South Wales held that since colonial bound-
aries did not include the territorial sea, the colonies lacked jurisdic-
tion over the territorial sea. 236 Colonial boundaries did not
specifically extend to the territorial sea,2 37 but this omission was not
229. 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 104 (1846) (U.K.).
230. Williams, 16 C.L.R. at 424-27, 449-53.
231. 13 & 14 Vict., ch. 59 (1850) (U.K.); Williams, 16 C.L.R. at 452-53.
232. 18 & 19 Vict., ch. 54 (1855) (U.K.).
233. Williams, 16 C.L.R. at 424-27, 453-57.
234. In St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, [1888] 14 App. Cas. 46
(P.C.), the Privy Council stated:
In construing these [British North America Acts], it must always be kept in view
that wherever public land with its incidents is described as "the property of" or as
"belonging to" the Dominion or a Province, these expressions merely import that
the right to its beneficial uses or its proceeds, has been appropriated to the Dominion
or the Province, as the case may be, and is subject to the control of its legislature, the
land itself being vested in the Crown.
Id. at 56.
235. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 405 (Gibbs, J.), 439 (Stephen, J.).
236. Id. at 370 (Barwick, C.J.), 382 (McTiernan, J.), 458-68 (Mason, J.).
237. Queensland contended that its grant was unique because its letters of patent granted
the colony not only land territory, but "'all and every the adjacent islands, their members
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critical. Several justices in New South Wales inferred that colonial
boundary descriptions included the territorial sea, which is appurte-
nant to the land territory.238 Additionally, in Merchant Service Guild
v. Commonwealth Steamship Owners Ass'n, 239 Justice Isaacs stated
that "the grant of powers of self-government to a component portion
of the Empire connotes, primarily, restriction of their exercise to the
limits of the local territory and its adjacent sea limit as recognized
universally and by the statute.
' '24
0
Colonial governments exercised sovereign and proprietary rights
over their territorial seas.241 They enacted statutes providing for
the establishment of harbours and the construction of wharves, jet-
ties and breakwaters, the control of navigation and pilotage, the
maintenance of lighthouses and lightships, the regulation of fish-
ing, whaling and prawning, and of diving for pearl shell and b~che-
de-mer, the grant of oyster leases and licenses to get marine fibres
and sponges, and the grant of leases to enable mining to be carried
out below low-water mark, and for customs and quarantine
purposes.
242
Imperial authorities never questioned the validity of these colonial
laws. Many imperial law officers who were distinguished attorneys
consistently affirmed colonial sovereignty and dominion over the ter-
ritorial sea in their legal opinions.243 Furthermore, in the 1866 case of
Rolet v. The Queen,244 the Privy Council recognized colonial jurisdic-
tion over the territorial sea, by declaring that the jurisdiction of the
colony of Sierra Leone extended three miles from its coast.245 The
Privy Council reasserted this position in 1901, in Carr v. Fracis,
Times, and Co. ,246 and again in 1916, in Secretary of State v. Chelikani
Rama Rao.
247
and appurtenances in the Pacific Ocean' . . 'Members' covers physical additions to the
islands such as land and reefs. 'Appurtenances' means the territorial sea and seabed." Id. at
351. Similarly, Tasmania asserted that its letter of patent gave it not only land, but "'all
islands and territories.' 'Territories' means the seabed." Id.
238. Id. at 406-07 (Gibbs, J.), 441 (Stephen, J.).
239. 16 C.L.R. 664 (1913) (Austl.).
240. Id. at 690.
241. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 402-06 (Gibbs, J.), 442-43 (Stephen, J.).
242. Id. at 404 (Gibbs, J.).
243. Id. at 404 (Gibbs, J.), 435, 441-42 (Stephen, J.); see also D.P. O'CONNELL, OPINIONS
ON IMPERIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123-25, 154-55, 159-60, 190-97 (1971).
244. 1 L.R.-P.C. 198 (1866) (Eng.).
245. Id. at 214.
246. 85 L.T.R. 144 (P.C. 1901) (Eng.).
247. 32 T.L.R. 652 (P.C. 1916) (India).
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The lack of the colonies' extraterritorial competence during the
nineteenth century made colonial jurisdiction over the territorial sea
particularly important. 248 Failure to consider the territorial sea as co-
lonial land would have invalidated the exercise of offshore colonial
jurisdiction. In the twentieth century, courts began to accept the ex-
ercise of extraterritorial colonial jurisdiction to the extent it was nec-
essary for the "peace, order, and good government" of the colony. 249
Noted scholar Enid Campbell pointed out that the exercise of colonial
extraterritorial jurisdiction for peace, order, and good government
was a post-hoc rationalization, developed by the courts to justify the
actions of colonial governments and was "unknown to the nineteenth-
century courts. '250
The Crown also recognized colonial jurisdiction over the territo-
rial sea. The Imperial Parliament approved leases for mining off the
coast of New South Wales. 25 l The 1885 Federal Council of Australa-
sia Act granted the council jurisdiction over both "fisheries in Austra-
lian waters beyond territorial limits" and "[tihe custody of offenders
on board ships belonging to Her Majesty's government beyond terri-
torial limits. ' 25 2 The Act defined the territorial limit as the territorial
sea.253 The Queensland Pearl Shell and B~che-de-mer Fisheries (Ex-
tra-territorial) Act of 1888 and the Western Australian Pearl Fisher-
ies (Extra-territorial) and B~che-de-mer Shell Act of 1889 both
construed the territorial sea as falling within colonial jurisdiction. 254
In 1901, the Australian Constitution incorporated the terms of the
Federal Council of Australasia Act.255 Specifically, section 51(x) of
the Australian Constitution granted the Commonwealth authority to
make laws with respect to "[flisheries in Australian waters beyond
territorial limits. ' ' 25 6 By granting the colonies authority to make laws
beyond their territorial limits, the Australian Constitution recognized
248. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 400-05 (Gibbs, J.), 448 (Stephen, J.); see also Barry
H. Dubner et al., Demarcation of Authority Over Coastal Waters, 10 STETSON L. REV. 228,
255-56 (1981). Lord Halsbury, in MacLeod v. New South Wales, stated that the colonies'
"jurisdiction is confined within their own territory." MacLeod v. New South Wales, 1891
App. Cas. 455, 457-58.
249. See Croft v. Dunphy, 1933 App. Cas. 156 (P.C.).
250. Enid Campbell, Regulation ofAustralian Coastal Fisheries, 1 TASMANIA L. REV. 405,
421 (1960).
251. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 405 (Gibbs, J.).
252. Id. at 402-03 (Gibbs, J.), 442-43 (Stephen, J.).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. AUSTL. CONST. § 51(x).
256. Id.
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colonial rights in the territorial sea.257
4. Australia's Federation and Authority Over the Territorial Sea
The status of the territorial sea did not change upon federation in
1901. Sections 106 and 107 of the Australian Constitution afforded
the states the same rights that they had possessed as colonies.258 The
Australian Constitution contained no explicit or implicit provisions
requiring the Australian states to surrender jurisdiction over the terri-
torial sea to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth's external af-
fairs authority, under section 51 (xxix) of the Australian Constitution,
did not establish federal jurisdiction over the territorial sea because
the territorial sea was not external to Australia. At federation, the
territorial sea of the colonies became the territorial sea of the states,
which, in turn, became the territorial sea of the Commonwealth. 259
The Australian Constitution divided power between the Com-
monwealth and state governments. In Federal Commissioner of Taxa-
tion v. Farley,260 Justice Evatt commented that the division of
legislative power between the Commonwealth and the states was de-
termined by which level of government exercised Crown preroga-
tives.261 Noting the difficulty in classifying Crown prerogative rights,
Justice Evatt proposed a division between (1) executive prerogatives,
(2) privileges and immunities, and (3) proprietary prerogatives. 262
He concluded that "those prerogatives which, prior to federation,
were exercisable through the King's representative in the area of a
colony, are, so far as they partake of the nature of proprietary rights,
still exercisable by the executives of the various States and for the
benefits thereof. ' 263 According to this scheme, the territorial sea re-
mained under state jurisdiction.
If the territorial sea was held by the Crown in right of Great
Britain, as the majority held, the territorial sea would have remained
Crown property after federation. The Commonwealth would not
have acquired jurisdiction over the territorial sea until either the Bal-
four Declaration in 1926 or the Statute of Westminster in 1931.264
257. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 402-03 (Gibbs, J.), 442-43 (Stephen, J.).
258. See AusTL. CONST. §§ 106, 107.
259. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 407-08 (Gibbs, J.), 443-49 (Stephen, J.).
260. 63 C.L.R. 270 (1940) (Austl.).
261. Id. at 319-23.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 322.
264. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 402 (Gibbs, J.).
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This position is contrary to several decisions of the High Court of
Australia prior to 1926, which recognized that Australian territory
included the territorial sea. In the 1906 case of Robtelmes v. Bre-
nan,265 Justice Griffith stated that "it is equally clear that the legisla-
ture of the Commonwealth cannot make any laws which have effect
as laws beyond its own territorial limits, that is to say three marine
miles from the coast. ' 266 In 1908, in Merchant Service Guild of Aus-
tralasia v. Archibald Currie and Co. ,267 Justice Barton declared,
"[T]he jurisdiction of that Court, as of any other Commonwealth
Court, must, of course, be confined within the territorial limits over
which the laws of the Commonwealth extend... [and] those laws can
have no operation beyond the three miles sea limit around Common-
wealth territory. ' 268 In the 1913 case of Merchant Service Guild v.
Commonwealth Steamship Owners Ass'n,269 Justice Isaacs recognized
"the prima facie correspondence of powers with [sic] Commonwealth
territory, including, of course, the marine league.
'270
Several state court decisions also considered the territorial sea to
be state territory. 271 In 1941, Justice Webb, in D. v. Commissioner of
Taxation,272 held that the territorial sea was part of the State of
Queensland. 273 Justice Webb concurred with Lord Shaw's decision in
Secretary of State v. Chelikani Rama Rao274 that the Keyn decision
only pertained to the extent of admiralty jurisdiction.275  Further-
more, Justice Webb found support for the states' property rights in
the territorial sea in Lord Kyllachy's decision in Lord Advocate v.
Clyde Navigation Trustees.27
6
The New South Wales majority held that the colonies relin-
quished any property rights in the territorial sea at federation because
265. 4 C.L.R. 395 (1906) (Austl.).
266. Id. at 404.
267. 5 C.L.R. 737 (1908) (Austi.).
268. Id. at 744.
269. 16 C.L.R. 664 (1913) (Austl.).
270. Id. at 692.
271. Bruce v. Moore, 1911 St. R. Qd. 57, 62-63 (Austl.); Chapman and Co. v. Rose, 1914
St. R. Qd. 302, 313, 319, 320, 325 (Austl.); Comm'r of Taxation v. Cam and Sons Ltd., 3
C.S.R. 544, 549 (1936) (N.S.W.).
272. 1941 St. R. Qd. 218 (Austl.).
273. Id. at 220-21.
274. 32 T.L.R. 652 (P.C. 1916) (India).
275. D. v. Comm'r of Taxation, 1941 St. R. Qd. at 220-21 (citing Chelikani Rama Rao, 32
T.L.R. at 652).
276. Id. (citing Lord Advocate v. Clyde Navigation Trustees, 19 R. 174 (1891)).
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these rights were an attribute of external sovereignty. 277 This position
confused international and domestic law, as well as notions of domin-
ion and imperium. Although the Commonwealth became the exter-
nal sovereign of Australia upon federation, this did not affect the
distribution of power between the Commonwealth and state govern-
ments.278 The Australian Constitution established a federal system,
apportioning government powers between the federal and state gov-
ernments. 279 In Broken Hill South Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxa-
tion,280 Justice Evatt stated, "Sovereignty is not attributable to one
authority more than to the others; it is divided between [the govern-
ments] in accordance with the demarcation of functions set out in the
Commonwealth Constitution. ' 281 According to Justice Evatt, the sta-
tus of the Australian states was "equal to, or co-ordinate with, that of
the Commonwealth itself. ' 282 The federal government only possessed
delegated authority. Any residual power remained with the states.
2 3
Since the Australian Constitution did not require the states to surren-
der or grant jurisdiction over the territorial sea to the Common-
wealth, the Australian states retained jurisdiction over the territorial
sea after federation.
IV. AUSTRALIA'S EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AUTHORITY AND THE
TERRITORIAL SEA
The New South Wales majority held that the Commonwealth
possessed broad authority over external affairs under section 51 (xxix)
of the Australian Constitution. 284 The Commonwealth's external af-
fairs authority superseded inconsistent state laws and was not limited
by the reserved powers of the states. The SSLA was a valid exercise
of the Commonwealth's external affairs authority. Offshore sub-
merged lands below the low-water mark were external to Australia,
277. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 372-75.
278. Id. at 407-08 (Gibbs, J.), 444-50 (Stephen, J.).
279. See AUSTL. CONST.
280. 56 C.L.R. 337 (1937) (N.S.W.).
281. Id. at 378.
282. Id.; see also Farley, 63 C.L.R. at 312 (stating that the Australian Constitution meant
"to establish two governments, State and Federal, side by side, neither subordinate to the
other"); Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co., 17 C.L.R.
644, 653 (P.C. 1913).
283. Broken Hill South Ltd., 56 C.L.R. at 378; see also New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at
446-47 (Stephen, J.).
284. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 360-66. According to the Australian Constitution,
"The Parliament shall.., have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government
of the Commonwealth with respect to: ... External affairs .... AUSTL. CONST. § 5 l(xxix).
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thus beyond state jurisdiction. As external sovereign, the Common-
wealth was authorized to sign the Conventions on the Territorial Sea
and Continental Shelf.2 5 The exercise of these "[s]overeign rights at
least impl[ies] exclusive and paramount rights to exploit together with
all the power necessary to secure the principal rights. ' 286 The New
South Wales court further found that the Commonwealth did not
have to rely on section 122 of the Australian Constitution, regarding
the acquisition of new territory, because the Crown had transferred its
sovereign and property rights over the territorial sea directly to the
Commonwealth.
28 7
The majority's interpretation of the Commonwealth's external
affairs authority under section 51 (xxix) was without limits. Justice
Gibbs and Justice Stephen pointed out that the Commonwealth's ex-
ternal affairs authority enabled the Commonwealth to enter into trea-
ties with other nations. 28 8 The Commonwealth's external affairs
authority was not a general grant of power to deal with the subject
matter of the treaty, but was limited to the enactment of legislation to
implement the provisions of the treaty.289 The SSLA was valid inso-
far as it implemented the Conventions on the Territorial Sea and Con-
tinental Shelf, but the establishment of federal jurisdiction over these
offshore areas was beyond the scope of either treaty. 290 Federal-state
jurisdiction over offshore areas was an issue that should have been
determined under constitutional law, not international law. 29' Conse-
quently, the Commonwealth's external affairs authority under Section
51 (xxix) did not establish federal jurisdiction over the territorial sea
or the continental shelf.
The Commonwealth has broad authority over external affairs
under section 51 (xxix) of the Australian Constitution. This power en-
abled the Commonwealth to govern the "relations between Australia
285. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 364.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 366. Section 122 of the Australian Constitution provides:
The Parliament may make laws for the government of any territory surrendered by
any State to and accepted by the Commonwealth, or of any territory placed by the
Queen under the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth, and may allow
the representation of such territory in either House of the Parliament to the extent
and on the terms which it thinks fit.
Ausm. CONST. § 122.
288. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 389-91 (Gibbs, J.), 444-45 (Stephen, J.).
289. Id. at 450-51 (Stephen, J.).
290. Id. at 451 (Stephen, J.).
291. Id. at 445-51 (Stephen, J.).
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and other countries, including other countries within the Empire." 292
The Commonwealth's external affairs authority permitted the Com-
monwealth Parliament to enact laws to implement international trea-
ties and agreements. 293 In New South Wales, Justice Gibbs stated that
"the external affairs power authorizes the Parliament to make a law
for the purpose of carrying out or giving effect to a treaty, at least if
the treaty is in reference to some matter indisputably international in
character."
294
A. The Australian Constitutional Limit on External
Affairs Authority
The Commonwealth's authority over external affairs is not un-
limited, but is circumscribed by the federal nature of the Australian
Constitution. 295 Justice Starke stated in The King v. Burgess296 that
the Commonwealth's external affairs authority "must be exercised
with regard to the various constitutional limitations expressed or im-
plied in the Constitution, which restrain generally the exercise of Fed-
eral powers. ' 297  The Commonwealth cannot circumvent the
restrictions of federalism by means of an international agreement. As
Justice Gibbs pointed 'out in Commonwealth of Australia v.
Tasmania,
298
The division of powers between the Commonwealth and the States
which the Constitution effects could be rendered quite meaningless
if the federal government could, by entering into treaties with for-
eign governments on matters of domestic concern, enlarge the leg-
islative powers of the Parliament so that they embraced literally all
fields of activity.
299
Justice Gibbs further cautioned that "no single power should be con-
292. The King v. Burgess, 55 C.L.R. 608, 643 (1936) (Austl.) (Latham, J.).
293. Id. at 687; New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 389-91 (Gibbs, J.), 444-45 (Stephen, J.).
294. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 390 (Gibbs, J.).
295. Id. at 444-51 (Stephen, J.); Burgess, 55 C.L.R. at 642 (Latham, J.).
296. 55 C.L.R. at 608.
297. Id. at 658 (Starke, J.). Other justices also commented on the constitutional limitation
established by section 51(xxix). Justice Latham stated, "The Executive Government of the
Commonwealth and the Parliament of the Commonwealth are alike bound by the Constitution
and the Constitution cannot be indirectly amended by means of an international agreement
made by the Executive Government and subsequently adopted by Parliament." Id. at 642.
Justices Evatt and McTiernan stated, "The legislative power in sec. 51 is granted 'subject to
this Constitution' so that such treaties and conventions could not be used to enable the Parlia-
ment to set at nought constitutional guarantees elsewhere contained." Id. at 687.
298. 57 C.L.R. 450 (1983) (Austl.).
299. Id. at 475 (Gibbs, J.).
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strued in such a way as to give the Commonwealth Parliament a uni-
versal power of legislation which would render absurd the assignment
of particularly carefully defined powers to that Parliament.
' 300
The New South Wales court concluded that since the territorial
sea and continental shelf were the subjects of international conven-
tions signed by the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth possessed ju-
risdiction over these offshore areas. 30' If this principle were carried to
its logical extreme, the Commonwealth could assert proprietary and
jurisdictional rights over all state lands that were the subjects of inter-
national conventions. This would violate the essence of federalism. It
would also contradict the Privy Council's holding that the federal
government's ability to enter into treaties did not establish federal ju-
risdiction over the subject matter of the treaty.30 2 Jurisdiction was
determined by the subject matter of the treaty.
303
B. External Affairs Authority Is Limited to
Implementing Treaty Terms
The Commonwealth's external affairs power is not a general
grant of authority over the subject matter covered by a treaty, but is
limited to implementing its terms. 3°4 In Burgess, the High Court of
Australia determined that the Commonwealth had authority under
section 51 (xxix) of the Australian Constitution to enact regulations
implementing the Air Navigation Convention of 1919.305 However,
the regulations in question were invalidated because they did not in-
clude many of the provisions of the Air Navigation Convention and
varied from its terms.30 6 The justices set forth similar tests to deter-
mine whether the regulations were authorized by the Air Navigation
Convention. Justice Latham stated that the regulations "must in sub-
stance be regulations for carrying out and giving effect to the conven-
tion."30 7 Justice Dixon declared that the regulations must be "a
300. Id. (citing Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 76 C.L.R. 1, 184-85 (1948)
(Austl.)).
301. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 360-66.
302. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, 1937 App. Cas. 326,
352-53 (P.C.); Joseph J. Arvay, Newfoundland's Claim to Offshore Mineral Resources: An
Overview of the Legal Issues, 5 CAN. PUB. POL'Y 32, 39-40 (1979).
303. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario, 1937 App. Cas. at 352-
53; Arvay, supra note 302, at 39-40.
304. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 390-91 (Gibbs, J.), 449-51 (Stephen, J.).
305. Burgess, 55 C.L.R. at 608.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 646.
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faithful pursuit of the purpose, namely, a carrying out of the external
obligation." 308 Justices Evatt and McTiernan stated that the regula-
tions must be "sufficiently stamped with the purpose of carrying out
the terms of the convention. '" 309 Similar limitations on the scope of
the Commonwealth's external affairs authority were set forth in Air-
lines of New South Wales v. New South Wales.310
The SSLA was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's external
affairs authority insofar as it implemented Australia's obligations
under the Conventions on the Territorial Sea and Continental
Shelf.31' There was, however, little need for domestic legislation to
implement the Conventions on the Territorial Sea and Continental
Shelf.3 12 Only the legal enforcement of conditions not authorized
under domestic law required domestic legislation. Articles 1 through
13 of the conventions did not require domestic legislation, because
they only dealt with relationships between nations, and articles 14
through 24, which may have needed domestic legislation, were not
addressed by the SSLA. 313 Furthermore, establishing federal jurisdic-
tion over offshore lands was beyond the scope of the Commonwealth's
external affairs authority. The Conventions on the Territorial Sea and
Continental Shelf did not provide for this condition, nor was it neces-
sary to carry out the Commonwealth's international obligations under
the conventions. Consequently, the SSLA exceeded the Common-
wealth's external affairs authority by establishing conditions not in-
cluded in the conventions and failing to implement the provisions in
the conventions.
The Australian High Court was correct to conclude in New
308. Id. at 674.
309. Id. at 688.
310. Airlines of New South Wales v. New South Wales, 113 C.L.R. 54 (1964-65) (Austl.).
Chief Justice Barwick stated:
But where a law is to be justified under the external affairs power by reference to the
existence of a treaty or a convention, the limits of the exercise of the power will be set
by the terms of that treaty or convention, that is to say, the Commonwealth will be
limited to making laws to perform the obligations, or to secure the benefits which the
treaty imposes or confers on Australia. Whilst the choice of legislative means by
which the treaty or convention shall be implemented is for the legislative authority, it
is for this Court to determine whether the particular provisions, when challenged, are
appropriate and adopted to that end. The Court will closely scrutinize the chal-
lenged provisions to ensure that what is proposed to be done substantially falls within
the power.
Id. at 86; see also id. at 102 (McTiernan, J.), 117 (Kitto, J.), 126 (Starke, J.), 140-41
(Menzies, J.).
311. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 451 (Stephen, J.).
312. Id. at 451-55 (Stephen, J.).
313. Id. (Stephen, J.).
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South Wales that section 122 of the Australian Constitution, which
deals with the acquisition of new territory,314 was not germane to the
case.3 15 Section 122 presumes that newly-acquired lands will eventu-
ally acquire representation in Parliament. Since offshore submerged
lands were not subject to such representation, they did not fall within
the scope of section 122. 316 Additionally, offshore submerged lands
could not be considered newly-acquired territory because such lands,
being appurtenant to existing territory, 317 were under state jurisdic-
tion. The Commonwealth could acquire rights over the offshore sub-
merged lands, but it would have to pay a fair and equitable price for
such rights under section 51 (xxxi) of the Australian Constitution.318
V. THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
A. Australia's External Affairs Authority and the Continental Shelf
The Australian High Court in New South Wales v. Common-
wealth 319 unanimously determined that the Commonwealth had juris-
diction over the continental shelf.320 The High Court held that the
Australian colonies had not asserted any claims of sovereignty or do-
minion over the continental shelf prior to federation. The Federal
Council of Australasia Act of 1885 granted the Commonwealth juris-
diction over the fisheries beyond territorial limits. Legislation passed
pursuant to the Australasia Act, granting the colonies limited fisheries
jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea, demonstrated that the Crown's
approval was needed before colonial jurisdiction could be exercised
beyond the territorial sea. The continental shelf was not considered
314. AUSTL. CONST. § 122.
315. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 366.
316. Id. at 390 (Gibbs, J.), 455 (Stephen, J.).
317. In the Norway-Sweden Boundary Arbitration in 1909, the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration held that, "in conformity with the fundamental principles of law of nations, both an-
cient and modem ... the maritime territory is an essential appurtenance of land territory
.... Decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Matter of the Maritime Boundary
Dispute Between Norway and Sweden, 4 AM. J. INT'L L. 226, 231 (1910) [hereinafter Norway-
Sweden Boundary Dispute].
318. Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution provides:
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to...
[t]he acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose
in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws.
AUSTL. CONST. § 51(xxxi).
319. 135 C.L.R. 337 (1975) (Austl.).
320. Id. at 374-75, 415-16 (Gibbs, J.), 457-58 (Stephen, J.).
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part of Australia. Continental shelf rights, which became recognized
under international law, accrued to the Commonwealth and not the
states. Accordingly, on September 11, 1953, the Commonwealth pro-
claimed sovereignty over the continental shelf off Australia, for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting natural resources.3 2' The Austra-
lian High Court held that the Commonwealth's assertion of jurisdic-
tion over the continental shelf was a legitimate exercise of its external
affairs authority under section 51(xxix) of the Australian
Constitution. 322
The High Court should have adopted a different position regard-
ing the continental shelf. Before the nineteenth century, the Crown
made broad proprietary and sovereign claims over offshore sub-
merged areas. 323 Although the Crown's offshore interest focused on
the territorial sea during the nineteenth century, its prerogative rights
beyond the territorial sea did not fall by desuetude.3 24 Instead, the
Crown exercised its prerogative rights beyond the territorial sea,
whenever commercially or technologically possible.325 If oil and gas
development on the continental shelf had been commercially or tech-
nologically possible in the nineteenth century, this enterprise would
have been considered a prerogative right of the Crown and the off-
shore energy resources would have been Crown royalties. 326 The
Crown's prerogative rights, including those beyond the territorial sea,
were granted to the Australian colonies when the colonies attained
self-government. They were not surrendered upon federation.
The recognition of continental shelf rights under international
law in the twentieth century did not bolster the Australian states' ju-
risdictional claims, but legitimated these claims under international
law. International law did not, in and of itself, create state rights over
the continental shelf. Rather, the continental shelf was considered
appurtenant to the coastal nations' land mass under international
law.327 Thus, coastal nations' rights over the continental shelf existed
ab initio and ipsofacto.3 28 The states' jurisdictional claims were based
321. L.F.E. Goldie, Australia's Continental Shelf" Legislation and Proclamations, 3 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 535, 539 (1954).
322. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 374-75, 457-58 (Stephen, J.).
323. See infra text accompanying note 329.
324. See infra text accompanying notes 340-45.
325. See infra text accompanying notes 332-37.
326. See infra text accompanying notes 338-39.
327. Norway-Sweden Boundary Dispute, supra note 317.
328. The International Court of Justice stated:
[T]he most fundamental of all the rules of law relating to the continental shelf... [is]
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on their grant of the Crown's prerogative rights under the Australian
Constitution. Furthermore, since this was a constitutional issue, in-
ternational law did not resolve the federal-state jurisdictional
question.
B. Crown Prerogative and the Contential Shelf
Before the nineteenth century, the Crown asserted broad claims
over the "narrow sea" surrounding Great Britain. Early common law
writers maintained that "the great waste of the sea" belonged to the
Crown. 329 In the nineteenth century, the Crown abandoned its broad
claim over the narrow sea and focused on the territorial sea. The
Crown's concern with the territorial sea did not signal its abandon-
ment of its claims to resources beyond the territorial sea. According
to noted commentator Thomas W. Fulton, sedentary fisheries and
mineral resources of the seabed and subsoil were not subject to the
narrow limits of the rules applicable to surface waters. Instead, they
"require[d] special treatment"330 because the resources of the seabed
and subsoil belonged to the adjacent coastal state, even when they
were located more than three miles from shore.331
In the nineteenth century, the Crown and the colonies exercised
jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea whenever commercially and
technologically possible.33 2 In 1811, the Crown allowed the colony of
Ceylon to regulate pearl fisheries beyond the three-mile limit.333 In
1858, the Cornwall Submarine Act recognized that the Crown's rights
in minerals and mines lying below the low-water mark off Cornwall
were not limited by the territorial sea.33 4 In 1867, Nova Scotia issued
leases for coal mines, both within and beyond the territorial sea.33 5 A
year later, the Imperial Parliament enacted a statute regulating the
that the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that
constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist
ipsofacto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension
of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and
exploiting its natural resources.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 2, 3 (Feb.
20) [hereinafter North Sea Cases].
329. LA FOREST, supra note 98, at 105; Hurst, supra note 98, at 43; see also O'Connell,
supra note 78, at 362; New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 387-488.
330. THOMAS W. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 612, 697 n.5 (1911).
331. Id
332. Hurst, supra note 98, at 40.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 34-47.
335. Nova Scotia issued the leases to William Sword on June 1, 1867. Id
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dredging of oyster beds and banks situated within twenty miles of the
coast of Ireland. 336 In 1927, Philip C. Jessup stated:
Of the coral, chank and pearl fisheries, Fulton says, "They may be
very valuable, are generally restricted in extent, and are admittedly
capable of being exhausted or destroyed; and they are looked upon
rather as belonging to the soil or bed of the sea than to the sea
itself. This is recognized in municipal law, and international law
also recognizes in certain cases a claim to such fisheries when they
extend along the soil under the sea beyond the ordinary territorial
limit." Vattel asserted that these resources near the shore may be
taken advantage of by the littoral state and subjected to its owner-
ship, apparently without regard to the limit of cannon range.
"Who can doubt," said Vattel, "that the pearl fisheries of Bahrein
and Ceylon may be lawful objects of ownership? Apparently the
British Government does not doubt it for they have asserted do-
minion over the Ceylon pearl banks far beyond the three mile limit
which they so stoutly uphold. '33
7
The exercise of commercial rights beyond the territorial sea was
a prerogative right of the Crown. If offshore energy development on
the continental shelf had been commercially and technologically feasi-
ble in the nineteenth century, it would have been considered a prerog-
ative right of the Crown. Offshore energy resources would have
become Crown royalties. The Privy Council held in Attorney General
for Ontario v. Mercer338 that Crown royalties were the equivalent of
"regalities" and included the "territorial revenues" derived from the
Crown's prerogative rights.339 The Crown's prerogrative rights, in-
cluding those beyond the territorial sea, were granted to the Austra-
lian colonies when they achieved self-government and were not
surrendered by the colonies at federation.
Although the Australian colonies did not engage in offshore en-
336. Hurst, supra note 98, at 40.
337. PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDIC-
TION 14 (1927).
338. [1883] 8 App. Cas. 767 (P.C.).
339. Id. at 778-79. The Privy Council, referring to section 109 of the British North
America Act, which grants the provinces "all Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties," stated
that "the general subject of the whole section is of a high political nature; it is the attribution of
royal territorial rights, for the purposes of revenue and government, to the provinces in which
they are situated, or arise." Id. Similarly, Clement, in his 1916 Canadian Constitution, stated
that there was nothing "to indicate a territorial limitation in the phrase 'in the province' differ-
ent from or greater than the essential territorial limitation which exists in the case of any




ergy development on the continental shelf, this Crown prerogative
right did not fall by desuetude. In Toy v. Musgrove,3 4° Chief Justice
Higinbotham declared that the non-use of the prerogative "in modem
times in England is no evidence that the right itself has become ex-
tinct."'3 41 In Universities of Oxford and Cambridge v. Richardson,34
2
Lord Eldon held that "[h]ere there is no such thing as a law going
into desuetude; and modem usage cannot be regarded as of equal au-
thority with the judgment of this Court."3 43 Justice Maitland, in his
Constitutional History, pronounced, "[W]e have no such doctrine as
that a prerogative may cease to exist because it is not used. ' ' 344 Justice
Evatt, in Certain Aspects of Royal Prerogative, stated, "[I]t is funda-
mental that no prerogative of the King disappears merely as a result
of non-use[ ].-345
C. The Convention on the Continental Shelf
National rights over the continental shelf were first recognized as
a principle of customary international law.3 46 In 1942, Great Britain
and Venezuela signed a treaty acknowledging each other's sovereignty
over the submerged areas in the Gulf of Paria, which separated Vene-
zuela and Trinidad. 347 On September 18, 1945, the United States is-
sued the Truman Proclamation, which proclaimed exclusive
jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the seabed and
subsoil of the continental shelf.3 48 The Truman Proclamation stated
that coastal nations had jurisdiction over their continental shelf re-
sources because (1) the continental shelf, which extended off the
coastal state's land mass, was naturally appurtenant to it; (2) the util-
340. 34 L.Q.R. 152 (1888).
341. Id. at 159.
342. 14 V.L.R. 349 (1802) (Vict.).
343. Id. at 378.
344. See Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Butterworth and Co., 38 N.S.W. St. R.
195, 227 (1938).
345. See id.
346. Principles of customary international law are established by concordant practice by a
number of states, regarding an issue within the domain of international relations. This is done
over a considerable period of time, upon the belief that the practice is required by international
law. There must also be general acquiescence to the practice by other states. D.P.
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (1965).
347. Reference Re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfound-
land, 5 D.L.R.4th 385, 411-12 (1984) (Can.) [hereinafter Newfoundland Reference].
348. Reference Re Ownership of Off-Shore Mineral Rights, 1967 S.C.R. 792 (Can.) [here-
inafter Mineral Rights Reference] (quoting the Truman Proclamation); see also Ann L. Hol-
lick, United States Oceans Policy: The Truman Proclamations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 23 (1977).
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ization and conservation of offshore resources required the coastal
state's cooperation; (3) the continental shelf resources often commin-
gled with the resources of the land territory; and (4) national defense
precluded one nation from developing continental shelf resources off
another nation's shore.
349
Following the Truman Proclamation, other nations declared ju-
risdiction over the continental shelf.350 By 1949, continental shelf
rights were recognized as a principle of customary international law.
Hersch Lauterpacht, a noted international scholar and former justice
on the International Court of Justice, pointed out that the length of
time required for a practice to evolve into a principle of customary
international law is irrelevant. 351 Custom is not another expression
for prescription. A consistent and uniform practice could develop
over a short period of time. The length of time necessary for the crys-
tallization of custom is proportionate to the degree and intensity of
the change that the custom purports to accomplish. Since the recog-
nition of continental shelf rights did not constitute a drastic change in
international law, a prolonged period of time to establish such rights
as a rule of customary international law was unnecessary.
352
Lauterpacht also pointed out the importance of the status of the
nations instituting a change in international law.353 The recognition
of continental shelf rights by the United States and Great Britain, the
leading maritime powers, was significant because both nations
strongly supported freedom of the seas and restrictive claims regard-
ing the territorial sea.354 The United States' and Great Britain's ac-
ceptance of continental shelf rights constituted strong evidence of an
emerging new principle of customary international law.
355
This new principle of customary international law was based on
geographical unity and contiguity.356 Both of these factors corre-
sponded to physical reality. The continental shelf could be viewed as:
(1) the extension of the continental land mass; (2) the result of accre-
tion from or accession to the coastal nation's land mass; or (3) an
349. Mineral Rights Reference, 1967 S.C.R. at 818-19.
350. Newfoundland Reference, 5 D.L.R.4th at 412; Henry H. Holland, The Juridicial Sta-
tus of the Continental Shelf, 30 TEX. L. REV. 586, 591-94 (1952).
351. Hersh Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 376,
393 (1950).
352. Id.
353. Id. at 394.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 394-95.
356. Id. at 423.
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area of the coastal nation experiencing marine transgression. 357 Fur-
thermore, the principle of contiguity as the basis of a nation's claim
over offshore areas was already recognized in international law.358
Lauterpacht asserted that contiguity, which rests upon geographical
unity, "provides a legal basis of utility and reasonableness which is
most consistent with the technical realities of the situation, with the
security of states, and with the requirement of international stabil-
ity."' 359 O'Connell, concurring with Lauterpacht's position, stated
that "economic necessity ... is the generating impulse of the [conti-
nental shelf] doctrine, and contiguity is relied on as the test for estab-
lishing the limits within which economic considerations will be
permitted to operate. '3 60
The modem doctrine of continental shelf rights is not based on
occupation.3 61 Offshore submerged lands could not be occupied in the
same manner as land territory.362 International law had moved away
from occupation as the basis of title.3 63 Additionally, a nation did not
have to issue a proclamation to claim continental shelf rights, because
proclamations were not "a source of a title or a means of acquiring
it."'3 64 Continental shelf proclamations declared, but did not consti-
tute, continental shelf rights. Since continental shelf rights arose by
right under international law, nations could issue proclamations at
their discretion.3 6
5
There was international acquiescence to national claims over the
continental shelf. Lauterpacht interpreted this lack of protest to
mean that the nations accepted the claims as conforming to the ex-
isting law.366 In addition, this absence of initial protests may have
estopped certain nations from asserting later challenges to the princi-
ple of continental shelf rights.367 Nations had a duty to voice their
objections if they felt continental shelf claims violated international
357. Id. at 430-31.
358. Norway-Sweden Boundary Dispute, supra note 317.
359. Lauterpacht, supra note 351, at 431.
360. O'CONNELL, supra note 346, at 577-78.
361. Lauterpacht, supra note 351, at 415-23.
362. Id.
363. Clipperton Island Arbitration, 6 Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases
105 (1931); Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, O.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 53, at 45-46; Lauter-
pacht, supra note 351, at 415-23.
364. Lauterpacht, supra note 351, at 418-19.
365. Id. at 394.
366. Id. at 395.
367. Id. at 397.
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law. Otherwise, a claimant was entitled to rely on their acquiescence
and plan the development of continental shelf resources. 368
By the end of 1950, sixteen nations had asserted claims to the
continental shelf.369 Nevertheless, there was extensive controversy re-
garding the status of continental shelf rights under international law.
The International Law Association and the International Law Com-
mission adopted the position that continental shelf rights were not yet
a principle of customary international law, although they noted that
this question was in dispute.370 Lord Asquith's 1951 decision in the
Abu Dhabi Arbitration371 provides some insight into the status of con-
tinental shelf rights.
In 1939, the Sheik of Abu Dhabi entered into an agreement with
Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited, a member of the
Iraq Petroleum Company, granting the company the exclusive rights
to develop and export oil from Abu Dhabi. In June 1949, the Trucial
Shiekdoms and a number of Middle Eastern states declared their ju-
risdiction and control over "the sea-bed and subsoil lying beneath the
high seas in the Persian Gulf contiguous to the territorial waters of
Abu Dhabi and extending seaward to boundaries to be determined
more precisely as occasion arises .... ",372 Following this proclama-
tion, the Sheik transferred the rights to develop and export oil from
the newly acquired offshore lands to Superior Oil Company of Cali-
fornia.373 A conflict ensued when Petroleum Development (Trucial
Coast) Limited asserted that the Sheik had transferred such rights to
it as part of the 1939 agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the agree-
ment, the parties submitted the dispute to arbitration. 374
As arbitrator, Lord Asquith determined that the rights the Sheik
368. Id. This would be the case, unless the action of the state making such claims was "so
wrongful in relation to any particular state or so patently at variance with General Interna-
tional Law as to render it wholly incapable of becoming the source of a legal right." Id.
369. Id. at 381-82; ZDEREK SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL
SHELF, A STUDY IN THE DYNAMICS OF CUSTOMARY RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 56
(1968).
370. J.P.R. Feith, Rights to the Seabed and its Subsoil, 1950 ILA DIGEST 87, 132; Hol-
land, supra note 350, at 595.
371. Arbitration Award of the Right Hon. Lord Asquith of Bishopstone in the Matter of
an Arbitration Between the Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited and His Excellency
Sheikh Shakhbut Bin Sultan Bin Za'id, Ruler of Abu Dhabi and its Dependencies, 1 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 247 (1952) [hereinafter Arbitration Award]; see also Edwin J. Cosford, Jr., The
Continental Shelf and the Abu Dhabi Award, 1 MCGILL L.J. 109 (1953).





granted in 1939 were confined to the area landward of and including
the territorial sea.375 Lord Asquith found that continental shelf rights
were not recognized in 1939, but were instead of recent origin. 376
Lord Asquith maintained that the draft articles of the 1951 Interna-
tional Law Commission were not declarations of existing interna-
tional law, but were merely proposals for future principles of
international law.377 Since nations were making diverse claims to the
resources below, on, and above the continental shelf of varying dis-
tances, Lord Asquith held that continental shelf rights did not exist
ipso jure in 1950.378 Nevertheless, Lord Asquith recommended the
development of international principles supporting continental shelf
rights resting on the doctrine of contiguity. 379
Scholars question Lord Asquith's decision regarding the status of
continental shelf rights in international law. O'Connell points out
that a principle of international law "may be vague as to extent and
application, but that is not to conclude, as Lord Asquith did, that it
lacks judicial character. ' 380 He asserts that principles of international
law begin as inchoate practices of states which are later given judicial
construction.3 8 According to O'Connell, "When it is observed that
some 30 nations have claimed their continental shelves, including the
major Powers with a preponderant interest in both freedom of the
seas and the protection of coastal resources, it is legitimate to assert
that the continental shelf concept is one of law. ' ' 38 2
The International Law Commission's work on the development
of continental shelf rights culminated at the 1958 Law of the Sea Con-
ference in Geneva. 383 Many of the delegates attending the Conference
viewed their role not as developers of international law, but as
codifiers of existing international law.384 Of the fifty-five participating
375. Id.
376. Id. at 127.
377. Id.
378. Lord Asquith stated, "[T]here are in this field so many ragged ends and unfilled
blanks, so much that is merely tentative and exploratory, that in no form can the doctrine
claim as yet to have assumed hitherto the hard lineaments or the definitive status of an estab-
lished rule of international law." Id.
379. Id. at 122.
380. O'CONNELL, supra note 346, at 577.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Shigeru Oda, A Reconsideration of Continental Shelf Doctrine, 32 TUL. L. REV. 27,
30 n.31 (1957); L.F.E. Goldie, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases-A Ray of Hope for the
International Court, 16 N.Y.L. FORUM 335, 337-38 (1970).
384. Goldie, supra note 383, at 347-48.
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delegations, twenty nations asserted that customary law recognized
continental shelf rights, while twelve denied the existence of such
rights and twenty-three expressed no opinion on the issue.38
5
The Law of the Sea Conference drafted the Convention on the
Continental Shelf,3 86 which codified the existing customary interna-
tional law. 387 The Convention first declared that coastal states have
exclusive rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of the
continental shelf adjacent to their coasts.3 88 Such rights exist ipso
jure, by right of law, thus eliminating the need for a proclamation or
occupation. Second, according to the Convention, continental shelf
rights do not affect the status of the superadjacent waters. The explo-
ration and exploitation of the natural resources of the continental
shelf must not interfere with navigation, fishing, scientific research, or
the conservation of living resources.3 89 Forty-six states signed the
Convention and by the summer of 1964, twenty-two states had rati-
fied or acceded to it.39o
D. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") decision in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases391 further articulated the status of conti-
nental shelf rights under international law. Great Britain negotiated
agreements that delimited the continental shelf in the North Sea with
Germany, Denmark, and Norway, whose coasts were all adjacent to
the North Sea.3 92 These agreements were based on the equidistance
principle of article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf,
which provides that the countries draw a median line between each
country, with all points on the line equidistant from the shores of the
opposite countries. 393 Denmark, Germany, and Norway, after unsuc-
cessful attempts to determine their lateral continental shelf bounda-
385. SLOUKA, supra note 369, at 91.
386. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 49 U.N.T.S. 311, 316, reprinted
in 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 858 (1958).
387. Natural Resources Reference, 145 D.L.R.3d 9, 40 (1983) (Can.).
388. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 386, arts. 1-2.
389. I.
390. SLOUKA, supra note 369, at 90.
391. 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). Pronouncements by the International Court of Justice "form
the living law and fuse with diplomatic practice to produce a rule governing the reflections of
authors, the opinions of governmental legal advisers, and the decisions of other judges."
O'CONNELL, supra note 346, at 30.
392. North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 3.
393. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 386, art. 6.
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ries, referred the issue to the ICJ.a94
The ICJ, by an eleven to six vote, found articles 1, 2, and 3, but
not article 6, to be binding principles of international law. 395 The ICJ
determined that delimitation of the continental shelf should be ac-
complished by equitable agreements that consider "all the relevant
circumstances" and grant to each party those parts of the continental
shelf that "constitutef- a natural prolongation of its land territory into
and under the sea," without encumbering the natural prolongation of
the land territory of another.
396
The ICJ's decision in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases is
significant for several reasons. First, by recognizing the continental
shelf as the natural extension of a nation's territory, the ICJ legiti-
mized the principle of contiguity.3 97 Continental shelf rights were
considered an appurtenancy based on the coastal state's sovereignty
over its land territory.398 This principle, derived from the Truman
Proclamation, was advocated by many prominent scholars.3 99
Second, the ICJ determined that the Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf was declaratory, not constitutive, of continental shelf
rights. The court viewed the Convention as "reflecting, or as crystal-
lizing, received or at least emergent rules of customary international
law. '"4 Several justices clearly indicated that the Convention on the
Continental Shelf merely codified existing principles of customary in-
394. Myron H. Nordquist, The Legal Status of Articles 1-3 of the Continental Shelf Con-
vention According to the North Sea Cases, 1 CASE W. INT'L L.J. 60, 63 (1970).
395. The ICJ stated that Article 12 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
permits reservations to be made to all the articles of the Convention "other than to
Articles 1 to 3 inclusive"-these three Articles being the ones which, it is clear, were
then regarded as reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or at least emergent rules of
customary international law relative to the continental shelf.
North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 39; Nordquist, supra note 394, at 67-68.
396. North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 53.
397. The ICJ stated:
[W]hat confers the ipso jure title which international law attributes to the coastal
State in respect of its continental shelf, is the fact that the submarine areas concerned
may be deemed to be actually part of the territory over which the coastal State al-
ready has dominion-in the sense that, although covered with water, they are a pro-
longation or continuation of that territory, an extension of it under the sea.
Id. at 31.
398. R.Y. Jennings, The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: Some Possible Implica-
tions of the North Sea Case Judgment, 18 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 819, 821-25 (1969); Phrand,
Continental Shelf Redefinition, 4 McGILL L.J. 536, 538-40 (1963); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 633 (Hersh Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); Lauterpacht, supra note 351, at
394-95, 423, 430-31.
399. See North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 39; Nordquist, supra note 394, at 67-68.
400. North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 39.
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ternational law.401
Third, the ICJ held that continental shelf rights exist ipso facto
and ab initio,402 thereby obviating any need for occupation or procla-
mation.40 3 Furthermore, since continental shelf rights exist ab initio,
such rights apply retroactively. 4 4 O'Connell stated:
[T]he expression ab initio suggests a relation back in time, perhaps
in geological time, for what the Court appears to mean is that no
history of events can be utilized to negate any coastal state's inher-
ent rights to the seabed, even though, when the events occurred,
the continental shelf doctrine was not imagined. 40 5
The recognition of continental shelf rights under international
law did not affect the status of the continental shelf between the Com-
monwealth and state governments, but simply recognized continental
shelf rights between nations. In New South Wales, Justice Stephen
noted that when the Convention on the Continental Shelf addressed
coastal state rights, it referred to those international nation-states
with coastlines. 40 6 International law did not establish the rights of the
Australian coastal states over the continental shelf, nor did it deter-
mine whether the Commonwealth or state governments had jurisdic-
tion over the continental shelf. These were questions of constitutional
law. Since continental shelf development was a prerogative right of
the Crown, this right was granted to the Australian colonies when
they achieved self-government and was not surrendered at federation.
If continental shelf development was not a prerogative right of the
Crown, the Australian states had no constitutional basis for their ju-
risdictional claim. International law could not cure this constitu-
,tional shortcoming. If this were the case, the Commonwealth's
assertion of jurisdiction over the continental shelf would have been a
401. Nordquist, supra note 394, at 65-71; North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 59, 96, 97, 120.
402. North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 22.
403. The ICJ stated:
In order to exercise it, no special legal process has to be gone through, nor have any
special legal acts to be performed. Its existence can be declared (and many States
have done this) but does not need to be constituted. Furthermore, the right does not
depend on its being exercised. To echo the language of the Geneva Convention, it is
"exclusive" in the sense that if the coastal State does not choose to explore or exploit
the areas of shelf appertaining to it, that is its own affair, but no one else may do so
without its express consent.
Id.
404. O'CoNNELL, supra note 346, at 578.
405. D.P. O'Connell, The Federal Problem Concerning Maritime Domain in Common-
wealth Countries, 1 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 389, 407 (1970).
406. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 458.
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legitimate exercise of its external affairs authority under section
51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution.40
VI. UNITED STATES AND CANADIAN TIDELANDS CONFLICTS
COMPARED WITH THE AUSTRALIAN TIDELANDS
CONTROVERSY
The dispute between central and peripheral governments over
the control of offshore submerged lands arose in other federal systems
prior to the Australian controversy. The offshore jurisdictional strug-
gle arose in the United States in 1947, 408 and in Canada in 1967.409
Both the United States and Canadian Supreme Courts determined
that offshore lands outside the low-water mark were beyond
state-provincial jurisdiction. 410 The federal governments' authority
over international affairs provided the basis for federal jurisdiction
over offshore lands.411 Although the Australian High Court, in New
South Wales v. Commonwealth, cited these decisions with approval,
41 2
both the United States and Canadian Supreme Court decisions were
flawed.413 Consequently, the New South Wales decision was also
defective.
A. The United States Tidelands Controversy
The first offshore jurisdictional conflict occurred in the United
States when the United States government brought suit against the
State of California, challenging California's assertion of title to off-
shore lands beyond the low-water mark.414  The United States
Supreme Court, focusing on the international aspects of the conflict,
declared that the federal government's sovereign interests in naviga-
tion, national defense, international relations, and commerce estab-
lished paramount rights over the submerged lands below the low-
407. Id. at 416.
408. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); see Fitzgerald, Tidelands Controversy,
supra note 2.
409. Mineral Rights Reference, 1967 S.C.R. 792 (Can.).
410. See id.; United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 19.
411. Mineral Rights Reference, 1967 S.C.R. at 792; United States v. California, 332 U.S. at
19.
412. New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 135 C.L.R. 337, 374-75 (Barwick, C.J.), 470
(Mason, J.), 505-06 (Murphy, J.) (1975) (Austl.).
413. Fitzgerald, Tidelands Controversy, supra note 2; Fitzgerald, Newfoundland, supra
note 2.
414. United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 19.
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water mark.41 5 One aspect of these paramount rights was dominion
over the resources located in the submerged lands.416 The United
States Supreme Court also rejected California's contention that the
"equal footing clause" of the Northwest Ordinance granted it the
same rights as the original Atlantic states because the original Atlan-
tic states never held title to their offshore submerged lands. 4' 7
The United States Supreme Court's decision was historically in-
accurate and confused dominion with imperium.418 Dominion refers
to ownership, while imperium refers to control.419 Although the fed-
eral government did have predominant sovereign rights over offshore
lands, these rights could not be construed as a claim of ownership. 420
The United States Supreme Court had never held that the power to
regulate constituted a grant of title.42' If such a principle had been
established, the federal government could have claimed title to all
United States land. The Supreme Court had also never determined
that United States rights under international law distinguished prop-
erty rights between the federal and state governments.422 In United
States v. California, the Supreme Court confused property rights,
which were determined by domestic law, with sovereignty, which was
determined by international law. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
failed to recognize that, since the original Atlantic states held title to
their offshore lands under colonial charters, coastal states subse-
quently admitted into the Union could make similar claims under the
equal footing clause. 423
415. Id. The theory of paramount rights was derived from United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 229 U.S. 304 (1936).
416. United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 29-41.
417. Id. at 36. The equal footing clause appears in the Northwest Ordinance, which dealt
with the admission of new states into the Union after independence. Article 5 of the Ordi-
nance provides: "[W]henever any of the said states shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants,
therein, such state shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United States, on
an equal footing with the original states, in all respects whatever .... " The equal footing
clause appears in every enabling statute admitting states into the Union, except that of Texas.
Comment, The Tidelands Oil Controversy, 10 DEPAUL L. REV. 116, 119 (1960).
418. United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 43-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
419. Id. at 43-44 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
420. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
421. United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 388 (1818); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.
Cas. 546, 551 (C.C. Wash. 1823) (No. 3,230).
422. See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1941); United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447 (1908); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,
572 (1823).
423. David H. Flaherty, Virginia and the Marginal Sea: An Example of History in the Law,
58 VA. L. REV. 694 (1972); Robert E. Hardwicke et al., The Constitution and the Continental
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In 1950, the United States Supreme Court again adopted the par-
amount rights rationale, in United States v. Texas424 and United
States v. Louisiana.4 25 United States v. Texas is of particular interest,
because from 1836 through 1845, Texas was an independent republic
with a three marine league territorial sea. The United States Supreme
Court rejected Texas' claim that, when Texas entered the Union,
Texas surrendered its imperium, but not its dominion, over its off-
shore lands.426 The Supreme Court adopted a novel interpretation of
the equal footing clause by recognizing Texas' imperium and domin-
ion over its offshore lands as that of a sovereign nation, but holding
that Texas relinquished authority over its offshore lands to the federal
government because of the overriding concerns of national defense
and international affairs.427 The Court held that the equal footing
clause precluded the extension of state sovereignty into the "domain
of political and sovereign power of the United States from which the
other States have been excluded.14 2  Therefore, property rights were
subordinate to political rights.
429
The United States Supreme Court was mistaken. When Texas
was admitted into the Union, it surrendered its imperium, not its do-
minion, over its offshore lands. This was manifested in the annexa-
tion agreement in which Texas granted the federal government
limited property for national defense and reserved for itself all "va-
cant and unappropriated lands lying within its limits. ' ' 430 Further-
more, the equal footing clause, which was not included in the Texas
annexation agreement, did not require Texas to cede its property to
the federal government. 431 The equal footing clause addressed polit-
ical and sovereign rights, not economic and property rights.432 This
was the first case in which the equal footing clause was interpreted to
deprive a state of "property which it had theretofore owned.
'433
The United States government soon abandoned the equal footing
Shelf, 26 TEX. L. REV. 398 (1948); Carl Iig, Offshore Lands and Paramount Rights, 14 U.
PiTr. L. REV. 10 (1952).
424. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
425. 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
426. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 719-20.
427. See id.
428. Id
429. Id. at 717-20.
430. Id. at 722 (Reed, J., dissenting).
431. Illig, supra note 423, at 15-21.
432. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 722 (Reed, J., dissenting).
433. Id. (Reed, J., dissenting).
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approach. In 1953, Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act,
which granted coastal states dominion and imperium over offshore
lands three miles or three marine leagues offshore. 434 In 1954, in Ala-
bama v. Texas,435 the United States Supreme Court upheld the Sub-
merged Lands Act. According to the Supreme Court, its prior
decisions had never asserted federal ownership of offshore submerged
lands, but only paramount rights over such lands.436 Paramount
rights were equivalent to property rights, which Congress could relin-
quish without interfering with United States sovereign interests.437
The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over offshore lands was a
domestic dispute over the congressional disposition of property. 438
Congress was not required to grant the same amount of offshore prop-
erty to each coastal state, 439 and could establish different boundaries
for different coastal states, because the equal footing clause referred
only to political and sovereign rights, not to property rights. Most
importantly, the Supreme Court recognized that dominion and impe-
rium could be separated; thus, property rights did not flow from sov-
ereignty. 44° This decision implicitly repudiated the paramount rights
rationale relied upon by the Supreme Court in its earlier decisions."'
In the 1975 case of United States v. Maine," 2 the United States
Supreme Court revived the paramount rights rationale, denying the
Atlantic states' claims of title over their offshore lands. The Supreme
Court held that the Atlantic states never held title to offshore sub-
merged lands below the low-water mark." 3 The first claim over such
lands was made by the federal government through its adoption of a
three mile territorial sea following the ratification of the United States
Constitution.4" The federal government's sovereign interests pro-
vided the basis for its paramount rights over offshore submerged
lands. The Submerged Lands Act merely relinquished federal claims
434. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
435. 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id at 274.
439. Id. at 274-76 (Reed, J., concurring).
440. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 274.
441. Dort S. Bigg, Comment, Inability of Complainant States to Test the Validity of an Act
Ceding Proprietary Rights in Submerged Lands to Coastal States: Alabama v. Texas, 34 B.U. L.
REV. 504, 507 (1954).
442. 420 U.S. 515 (1975).




over offshore lands three miles from the Atlantic states' coastlines. 445
Notably, the Supreme Court refused to reconsider the rationale of its
earlier decisions.
44 6
The United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Maine was erroneous for several reasons. First, the doctrine of para-
mount rights did not establish federal jurisdiction over offshore lands.
That position was negated by the Submerged Lands Act and subse-
quent cases.447 Second, the Atlantic states' claims over offshore sub-
merged lands were derived from colonial charters, which granted the
colonies all of the territory claimed by the Crown. In the seventeenth
century, the Crown claimed territorial sovereignty over the seabed
and seabed resources 100 miles from shore. The Crown's title passed
directly to the coastal states, not to the federal government.4 8 Legal
developments from 1783 through 1945 did not extinguish the coastal
states' offshore rights. The Submerged Lands Act simply affirmed the
coastal states' title to submerged lands within their historic bounda-
ries and granted them an additional three mile or three marine league
belt.449 Since all of the submerged lands granted under colonial char-
ters were beneath state inland waters, such offshore lands belonged to
the Atlantic states. 450 Consequently, the boundaries of the Atlantic
states should have been three miles from the end of their inland wa-
ters, which were established by colonial charters and royal practice in
1787.451
B. The Canadian Tidelands Controversy
Offshore petroleum development also generated conflict between
the federal and provincial governments in Canada. Offshore energy
exploration first occurred off the coast of Prince Edward Island in
1943 under provincial jurisdiction.452 British Columbia began issuing
permits for offshore energy exploration in 1949 and federal licensing
of offshore energy operations started in 1960, two years after the pro-
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. See 43 U.S.C §§ 1301-1305.
448. For a general discussion of Great Britain's territorial sovereignty and the territorial
sea, see O'Connell, supra note 78.
449. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1305.
450. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
451. Fitzgerald, Tidelands Controversy, supra note 2, at 238-40.
452. Ian T. Gault, Jurisdiction Over the Petroleum Resources of the Canadian Continental
Shelf. The Emerging Principle, 23 ATLA. L. REV. 78, 80 (1985).
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mulgation of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.453 Federal
regulations declared provincial permits invalid and instructed holders
of provincial permits to apply for federal licenses. 45 4 The provinces
did not accede to this usurpation of provincial authority; rather, they
continued to exercise jurisdiction over offshore lands. 455 The Cana-
dian government sought to resolve the conflict by referring the juris-
dictional question to the Canadian Supreme Court.45 6 Accordingly,
the Governor-in-Council, by order of the council, asked the Canadian
Supreme Court to determine whether the submerged lands beneath
the territorial sea were the property of British Columbia or Canada,
and whether British Columbia or Canada had the right to explore and
exploit the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf.457
In November 1967, the Canadian Supreme Court rejected British
Columbia's claim of jurisdiction over the territorial sea and continen-
tal shelf, in Reference Re Ownership of Off-Shore Mineral Rights
("Mineral Rights Reference").458 The court, relying on Regina v.
Keyn, held that the provincial boundary terminated at the low-water
mark.459 The Imperial Parliament could have extended the provincial
boundary, but did not. Since the territorial sea was outside of British
Columbia, the province lacked jurisdiction over the area.460 Accord-
ing to the Canadian Supreme Court, after British Columbia confeder-
ated with Canada in 1871, the Crown's rights in the territorial sea,
originally claimed for British Columbia, became Crown rights held
for Canada. The Crown's rights were then granted to Canada upon
its independence, which occurred between 1919 and 1931.461 The Ca-
nadian Supreme Court determined that, because those rights in the
territorial sea and the continental shelf were sovereign rights recog-
nized under international law, Canada's signing of the Conventions
on the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf, as external sovereign,
453. Id. at 80.
454. Id.
455. Elliot Treby, The Role of the Political Idiom in Jurisdictional Conflicts Over Offshore
Oil and Gas, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 281, 292 (1974).
456. Gerald Rubin, The Nature, Use and Effect of Reference Cases in Canadian Constitu-
tional Law, 6 MCGILL L.J. 168 (1959-60); Peter H. Russell, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of Canada: Present Policites and a Programme for Reform, 6 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 10-
11 (1968).
457. Mineral Rights Reference, 1967 S.C.R. at 792.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 817.
460. Id. at 821.
461. Id. at 815-16.
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established federal jurisdiction over these areas.462
A brief review of Canadian history demonstrates that the Cana-
dian Supreme Court erred in its conclusion. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Crown held all property and sovereign rights over British
Columbia's territorial sea and exercised prerogative rights beyond the
territorial sea whenever commercially feasible. Resources beyond the
territorial sea were Crown royalties. These rights were granted to
British Columbia prior to its confederation with Canada in 1871. 46 3
The province of British Columbia was established in stages. In
1849, Great Britain granted Vancouver Island the rights to the Hud-
son Bay Company. In 1858, the Imperial Parliament established the
government of British Columbia. Finally, in 1866, the Imperial Par-
liament unified the colonies of Vancouver Island and British Colum-
bia.464 When the province of British Columbia was established, the
Crown in right of the colony held title and jurisdiction over all
unalienated land, including the mines and minerals located therein, as
well as the territorial sea. 465 In Attorney-General of British Columbia
v. Attorney-General of Canada,466 the Privy Council stated:
The title to the public lands of British Columbia has all along been,
and still is, vested in the Crown; but the right to administer and to
dispose of those lands to settlers, together with all royal and terri-
torial revenues arising therefrom, had been transferred to the Prov-
ince before its admission into the federal Union.467
Even if British Columbia did not possess offshore rights prior to
confederation in 1871, it was granted the Crown's rights over the ter-
ritorial sea and continental shelf under the British North America
Act of 1867 ("BNAA").46 Term 10 of the Terms of Union of British
Columbia with Canada placed British Columbia on the same footing
as the original four provinces that constituted the dominion of Can-
ada, and also granted British Columbia the same property rights as
the original provinces. 469 The BNAA, which established the domin-
462. Mineral Rights Reference, 1967 S.C.R. at 817-21.
463. Reference Re Ownership of the Bed of the Straight of Georgia and Related Areas, 1
B.C.L.R. 97, 99-103 (1976) (Can.) [hereinafter Bed of Straight Reference].
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. [1889] 14 App. Cas. 295 (P.C.).
467. Id. at 301.
468. 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (1867) (U.K.).
469. See Terms of Union of British Columbia with Canada (1871). Term 10 provides:
The provisions of the British North America Act, 1867, shall (except those parts
thereof which are in terms made, or by reasonable intendment may be held to be
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ion of Canada, divided governmental powers between the dominion
and provincial governments. Section 109 of the BNAA states that the
provinces retained "[a]ll Lands, Mines, Minerals and Royalties be-
longing to the several Provinces of Canada ... ,,470 Term 10 of the
Terms of Union applied section 109 of the BNAA to British Colum-
bia. As a result, British Columbia received beneficial use and control
over the Crown's offshore resources, including the territorial sea and
continental shelf.
47'
In Mineral Rights Reference, the Canadian Supreme Court, rely-
ing on Regina v. Keyn, 472 held that provincial territory ended at the
low-water mark, unless extended by Imperial legislation. Because
such legislation did not exist, British Columbia lacked jurisdiction
over the territorial sea.473 The court failed to recognize that there was
also no Imperial legislation extending dominion jurisdiction over the
territorial sea. According to the court's rationale, Canada also lacked
jurisdiction over its own territorial sea until 1959, when it ratified the
Convention on the Territorial Sea.474 Yet, in the 1931 case of May v.
The King,475 the Canadian Supreme Court held that "[i]t is a well
recognized principle, both in this country and in the United States,
that the jurisdiction of a nation is exclusive and absolute within its
own territory of which its territorial waters within three marine miles
from shore are as clearly a part, as the land. ' 476
The Canadian Supreme Court's holding that the federal govern-
specifically applicable to and only affect one and not the whole of the Provinces now
comprising the Dominion, and except so are as the same may be varied by this Min-
ute) be applicable to British Columbia, in the same way and to the like extent as they
apply to the other Provinces of the Dominion, and as if the Colony of British Colum-
bia had been on of the Provinces originally united by the said Act.
Id.
470. Section 109 of the BNAA provides in full:
All Lands, Mines, Minerals and Royalties belonging to the several provinces of Can-
ada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick at the Union, and all sums then due or paya-
ble for such Lands, Mines, Minerals or Royalties, shall belong to the several
Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick in which the same
are situate or arise, subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Inter-
est other than that of the Province in the same.
30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3, § 109.
471. St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, [1888] 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.).
472. 2 Ex. D. 63 (1876) (Eng.).
473. Mineral Rights Reference, 1967 S.C.R. at 804-08.
474. Canada signed the Convention on the Territorial Sea on April 29, 1959. The Conven-
tion came into force on September 10, 1964, when it was ratified by a sufficient number of
nations. Id. at 808.
475. 3 D.L.R. 15 (1931) (Can.).
476. Id. at 20-21.
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ment's ability to enter into treaties regarding the territorial sea and
continental shelf established federal jurisdiction over these areas ig-
nores the distinction between treaty making and treaty implementa-
tion. In 1937, the Privy Council determined that the federal executive
had the exclusive power to negotiate treaties on behalf of Canada.477
Nevertheless, the Privy Council held that treaties did not become in-
corporated into the law of Canada unless they were adopted and im-
plemented by the appropriate legislature, which was determined by
the treaty's subject matter.478 When the subject matter was within the
jurisdiction of the province, the province had to implement the treaty
before it became binding on Canada. 479 Ivan Head, a noted Canadian
scholar, emphasized that the Canadian Supreme Court "failed to ap-
preciate that 'the Crown in right of Canada' vis i vis other nation
states in the international community is a different legal entity from
'the Crown in right of Canada' vis i vis the provinces in the federal
community. ' 480 Head concluded that the Canadian Supreme Court
could not have intended this result, as the Court's statement on this
matter contravened the Privy Council's earlier determination. 48 1
In addition, the Canadian Supreme Court's characterization of
offshore rights as external sovereign rights was irrelevant to the analy-
sis. Although the federal government was, in fact, the external sover-
eign of Canada, this did not establish federal jurisdiction over offshore
lands. Otherwise, the federal government would have property rights
over all Canadian lands. The jurisdiction over offshore lands off the
coast of British Columbia was governed by the Terms of Union and
the BNAA.
The Canadian Supreme Court failed to follow decisions of the
provincial supreme courts that recognized provincial jurisdiction over
the territorial sea. For example, in 1875, the Newfoundland Supreme
Court held that provincial jurisdiction extended three miles seaward
from a closing line drawn across the mouth of Conception Bay.48 2
The Newfoundland Supreme Court reaffirmed Newfoundland's juris-
477. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, 1937 App. Cas. 326,
347 (P.C.).
478. Id. at 348.
479. Id. at 352.
480. Ivan L. Head, The Canadian Offshore Minerals Reference: The Application of Inter-
national Law to a Federal Constitution, 18 U. TORONTo L.J. 131, 155 (1968).
481. Id. at 156.
482. Anglo-American Tel. Co. v. Direct United States Cable Co., 6 Nfld. L.R. 28 (1875).
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diction over the territorial sea in 1888, and again in 1889.483 Other
provincial courts recognized provincial jurisdiction over the territorial
sea. In 1932, the New Brunswick Supreme Court upheld a conviction
for possessing intoxicating liquor within the province, one and three-
quarters miles from shore.484 The New Brunswick Supreme Court
stated that the territorial sea "is now so generally admitted in interna-
tional law that [we] do not think that it is open to question that the
legislative authority of the province extends over that area." 485
In 1984, the Canadian Supreme Court resolved the offshore juris-
dictional conflict between the federal government and the Atlantic
province of Newfoundland, by holding that Newfoundland lacked ju-
risdiction over the territorial sea and continental shelf.486 The Cana-
dian Supreme Court erroneously relied on the flawed logic of
Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Attorney-General for Can-
ada.4 87 The court also failed to recognize that, because Newfound-
land was a dominion prior to confederating with Canada,
Newfoundland was entitled to all of the rights recognized by interna-
tional law at that time, including jurisdiction over the territorial sea
and continental shelf.
48 8
Prior to 1926, Newfoundland was a self-governing colony, exer-
cising jurisdiction over its territorial sea through customs, fishing, and
hovering acts.489 When Newfoundland became a dominion in 1926, it
received all of the rights held by the Crown and, thus, possessed the
same degree of sovereignty as Canada and Australia.49° Newfound-
land continued to exercise jurisdiction over its offshore lands and did
not surrender its jurisdiction during the Commission government
which ruled Newfoundland from 1934 through 1949.491 Throughout
this period, Great Britain and other nations continued to recognize
Newfoundland's sovereignty. 492 Even if Newfoundland had lost its
483. Rhodes v. Fairweather, 7 Nfid. L.R. 321 (1888); The Queen v. Delephine, 7 Nfld.
L.R. 378 (1889).
484. Rex v. Burt, 5 M.P.R. 112 (1932) (N.B.).
485. Id. at 118.
486. Newfoundland Reference, 5 D.L.R.4th 385 (1984) (Can.).
487. [1889] 14 App. Cas. at 295.
488. See generally Fitzgerald, Newfoundland, supra note 2.
489. Natural Resources Reference, 145 D.L.R.3d 9, 20-36 (1983) (Can.); DEPT. OF MINES
AND ENERGY, NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, HERITAGE OF THE SEA: OUR CASE ON
OFFSHORE MINERAL RIGHTS 2 (1982).
490. Natural Resources Reference, 145 D.L.R.3d at 26.
491. Id. at 31-33.
492. Id. at 32.
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sovereignty, Term 7 of the Terms of Union of Newfoundland with
Canada493 ("Terms of Union") would have revived its dominion sta-
tus immediately prior to confederation. 494 This entitled Newfound-
land to all rights recognized by international law, including
jurisdiction over the territorial sea and continental shelf.
When Newfoundland confederated with Canada in 1949, it re-
tained all property held by the Crown in right of the province. Term
37 of the Terms of Union granted Newfoundland common law prop-
erty rights and Crown property rights to the beneficial use, control,
disposition, and management of the Newfoundland territory. 495
These rights were not restricted to Newfoundland's land territory 496
and Newfoundland was not required to surrender any of its property
to be placed on equal footing with the other Canadian provinces.497
When litigation failed to resolve the dispute, there was a political
settlement. On February 11, 1985, Newfoundland and Canada signed
the Atlantic Accord, which regulated offshore petroleum manage-
ment and provided for revenue-sharing in the offshore area from the
low-water mark to the continental shelf margin.498 The Atlantic Ac-
cord established joint federal and provincial administration and en-
sured that the pace and manner of offshore development would
optimize social and economic benefits. The Atlantic Accord was
designed to provide a stable offshore management regime to en-
493. Term 7 of the Terms of Union of Newfoundland with Canada states:
The Constitution of Newfoundland as it existed immediately prior to the 16th day of
February, 1934, is revived at the date of Union and shall, subject to these Terms and
the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1940, continue as the Constitution of the Province of
Newfoundland from and after the date of Union, until altered under the authority of
the said Acts.
Schedule Terms of Union of Newfoundland with Canada, No. 32 (1949), reprinted in R.S.C.
app. (1985) [hereinafter Terms of Union].
494. Newfoundland Reference, 5 D.L.R.4th at 406-07.
495. Term 37 grants:
All lands, mines, minerals, and royalties belonging to Newfoundland at the date of
Union, and all sums then due or payable for such lands, mines, minerals, or royalties,
shall belong to the Province of Newfoundland, subject to any trusts existing in re-
spect hereof, and to any interest other than that of the Province in the same.
Terms of Union, supra note 493, term 37; see also St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co.,
[1888] 14 App. Cas. at 46.
496. Natural Resources Reference, 145 D.L.R.3d at 34-46.
497. Id. at 20, 34-35.
498. C.P. MacDonald & R.S.G. Thompson, The Atlantic Accord: The Politics of Compro-
mise, 24 ALTA. L. REV. 61 (1985); Robert M. Sinclair, The Atlantic Accord: Joint Management
of Offshore Oil and Gas Resources Off Newfoundland and Labrador, 2 Bus. & L. 52 (July
1985); Douglas Day, Maritime Boundaries, Jurisdictional Disputes; and Offshore Hydrocarbon
Exploration in Eastern Canada, 23 J. CAN. STUD. 60, 77-81 (1988).
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courage offshore energy development. 499
C. Australian Political Settlement in the Tideland Controversy
The High Court of Australia failed to resolve the tidelands con-
troversy in New South Wales. The Australian litigation, like its coun-
terpart in the United States and Canada, generated political
negotiations between the Commonwealth and state governments
which, in turn, led to a political settlement.
In November 1975, the Whitlam Labor government, which pos-
sessed a strong nationalist orientation, was voted out of office. 5°° That
December, four days before the Australian High Court's decision in
New South Wales, the Fraser Liberal-National government assumed
power.50 1 The Fraser government adopted a new policy of federalism,
calling for greater state responsibility, which was applauded by the
states.
502
Negotiations between the Commonwealth and state governments
regarding offshore submerged lands soon commenced. In 1976, the
Standing Committee of Attorney-Generals agreed to investigate the
opportunities for Commonwealth-state cooperation, regarding off-
shore development. In 1977, the state premiers convened to discuss
offshore issues.50 3 As a result of the federal-state negotiations, which
continued over the next two years, the Commonwealth relinquished
control over the territorial sea to the state governments. 5°4 In 1979,
the following "Agreed Arrangements" were announced:
1. The area reverting to predominantly state control would be lim-
ited to a territorial sea of 3 nautical miles irrespective of whether
Australia subsequently moved to a territorial sea of 12 nautical
miles.
2. The Commonwealth Parliament would pass legislation to give
each state the same powers with respect to the territorial sea (in-
cluding the seabed) as it would have had if the territorial sea had
been within the limits of a state.
3. The Commonwealth Parliament would pass legislation to vest
499. MacDonald & Thompson, supra note 498; Sinclair, supra note 498; Day, supra note
498.
500. W.G. McMINN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA 194-97 (1979); RICH-
ARD CULLEN, FEDERALISM IN ACTION: THE AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN OFFSHORE Dis-
PUTES 104-08 (1990).
501. McMINN, supra note 500, at 194-97; CULLEN, supra note 500, at 104-08.
502. MCMINN, supra note 500, at 194-97; CULLEN, supra note 500, at 104-08.




in each state proprietary rights and title in respect of the seabed of
the territorial sea.
4. The Commonwealth Parliament would make consequential
amendments to the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 to ensure
that state laws relying on the legislation mentioned in 2. and 3.
would not be invalidated by that Act.
5. Offshore petroleum operations outside the territorial sea would
be regulated by Commonwealth legislation alone, consisting of an
amended Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth.), although
day-to-day administration would continue to be in the hands of
each state.
6. Offshore petroleum operations in the territorial sea would be
regulated by state legislation alone although the Common Mining
Code would be retained as far as practicable.
7. Arrangements would be made to institute a regime for the min-
ing of offshore minerals other than petroleum in the same format
as described in 5. and 6.
8. New arrangements would be introduced to enable single fisher-
ies to be regulated by one set of laws, Commonwealth or state as
agreed between the parties.
9. The Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 (Cth.) would be amended so
that it would be applicable to waters adjacent to a state or the
Northern Territory only with the consent of that State or territory.
.10. The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 (Cth.) would
continue to apply to the whole of the Great Barrier Reef region as
defined in that Act and the rights and title to be vested in respect of
the seabed of the territorial sea would be subject to the operation of
that Act. Other marine parks would be the subject of Common-
wealth/state consultation.
11. An agreed scheme of complementary Commonwealth/state
legislation would be put in place to ensure that an appropriate
body of Australian criminal law would be applicable offshore.
12. The regulation of shipping and navigation would be divided
between the states and the Commonwealth with the Common-
wealth being responsible for trading vessels on interstate or over-
seas voyages, drilling vessels, and the implementation of an
Australian shipping register. The parties would also implement
the Uniform Shipping Laws Code published in the Commonwealth
Gazette on 28 December, 1979.
13. Commonwealth legislation would continue to control ship-
sourced marine pollution.
14. The Northern Territory would be treated as a state for the pur-
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poses of the settlement. 50 5
The legislative scheme implementing the Agreed Arrange-
ments50 6 posed some interesting constitutional issues. The Coastal
Waters (State Title) Act of 1980 transferred the Commonwealth's title
over the submerged lands beneath the territorial sea to the individual
states. Even if Australia's territorial sea is widened, it will still not
expand state title. The Coastal Waters (State Title) Act of 1980 by-
passed potential problems under section 123 of the Australian Consti-
tution, which prohibits the expansion of a state's boundary without a
state referendum. 50 7 Since neither the Commonwealth nor the state
governments wanted a referendum, the Act did not alter state bound-
aries. Instead, it simply placed submerged lands beneath the territo-
rial sea beyond state boundaries over which the states held title. 508
Since the offshore submerged lands were outside of the states'
boundaries, the states questioned their ability to regulate the area
comprehensively. The Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act addressed
this problem by utilizing section 51 (xxxviii) of the Australian Consti-
tution. Section 5 l(xxxviii) allows the Commonwealth Parliament to
make laws with respect to the local exercise of any legislative power
which, before federation, could only be exercised by the Imperial Par-
505. Id. at 108-09.
506. The Commonwealth legislation included: Crimes at Sea Act 1979, No. 17, 1979
AuSTL. ACTS P. 154; Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980, No. 75, 1980 AUSTL. ACTS P.
790; Coastal Waters (Northern Territory Powers) Act 1980, No. 76, 1980 AUSTL. ACTS P.
793; Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980, No..77, 1980 AUSTL. ACTS P. 796; Coastal Waters
(Northern Territory Title) Act 1980, No. 78, 1980 AUSTL. ACTS P. 799; Seas and Submerged
Lands Amendment Act 1980, No. 79, 1980 AusTL. AcTs P. 802; Petroleum (Submerged
Lands) Amendment Act 1980, No. 80, 1980 AUSTL. AcTs P. 804; Petroleum (Submerged
Lands) (Royalty) Amendment Act 1980, No. 81, 1980 AUSTL. ACTS P. 846; Petroleum (Sub-
merged Lands) (Exploration Permit Fees) Amendment Act 1980, No. 83, 1980 AUSTL. ACTS
P. 852; Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Pipeline Licence Fees) Amendment Act 1980, No. 84,
1980 AUSTL. ACTS P. 854; Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Production Licence Fees) Amend-
ment Act 1980, No. 85, 1980 AUSTL. ACTS P. 856; Fisheries Amendment Act 1980, No. 86,
1980 AusTL. ACTS P. 858; Navigation Amendment Act 1980, No. 87, 1980 AUSTL. ACTS P.
871; and Historic Shipwrecks Amendment Act 1980, No. 88, 1980 AUSTL. ACTS P. 912. See
CULLEN, supra note 500, at 109 n.133.
507. Section 123 of the Australian Constitution states:
The Parliament of the Commonwealth may, with the consent of the Parliament of a
State, and the approval of the majority of the electors of the State voting upon the
question, increase, diminish, or otherwise alter the limits of the State, upon such
terms and conditions as may be agreed on, and may, with the like consent, make
provision respecting the effect and operation of any increase or diminution or altera-
tion of territory in relation of any State affected.
AUSTL. CONST. § 123.
508. Cullen, Canada and Australia, supra note 25, at 75.
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liament. 509 Because the Imperial Parliament initially held jurisdiction
over the territorial sea, the Commonwealth Parliament, at the request
of the states, could surrender such jurisdiction to the states.510 Such
jurisdiction could not be unilaterally terminated because authority
under section 51 (xxxviii) could only be granted and repealed at the
request of the states. Furthermore, since the coastal states were
granted title, section 51 (xxxi) of the Australian Constitution requires
the Commonwealth to pay fair compensation to purchase the lands
from the states.5
1
In the 1989 case of Port MacDonnell PFA Inc. v. South Australia,
the Australian High Court upheld the constitutionality of the Coastal
Waters (State Powers) Act. 512 Port MacDonnell involved an agree-
ment between the Commonwealth and State of South Australia re-
garding the management of rock lobster fishing adjacent to South
Australia. The Australian High Court determined that section
5 1(xxxviii) should be broadly interpreted for several reasons. First,
the section was designed to fill in the policy gaps with regard to Com-
monwealth and state legislative powers. Second, section 51(xxxviii)
does not enhance Commonwealth power at the expense of the states,
but expands the potential and actual power of state legislatures. 513
Section 5(c) of the Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act, confirming and
expanding the scope of state legislative authority, comported with sec-
tion 51(xxxviii), because the Imperial Parliament exercised exclusive
authority over fisheries beyond state coastal waters at the time of fed-
eration.51 4 Consequently, the Australian High Court found the
Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act valid. Although the Court ad-
dressed only part of the Agreed Arrangements, it is likely that other
legislative elements of the Agreements will be endorsed in the
509. Section 5 l(xxxviii) of the Australian Constitution provides:
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: ...
(xxxviii) The exercise within the Commonwealth, at the request or with the concur-
rence of the Parliaments of all the States directly concerned, of any power which can
at the establishment of this Constitution be exercised only by the Parliament of the
United Kingdom or by the Federal Council of Australasia.
AUSTL. CONST. 51 (xxxviii).
510. Cullen, Canada and Australia, supra note 25, at 75-76.
511. Id. at 77; see also supra note 318 and accompanying text.
512. Port MacDonnell PFA Inc. v. South Australia, 63 Austl. L.J. Rep. 671 (1989).
513. Id. at 683-84.
514. Id. at 684-86.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Australia, like the United States and Canada, experienced con-
flict between the federal and state governments regarding jurisdiction
over offshore submerged lands rich in petroleum resources. Australia
sought to avoid the litigation that plagued offshore energy develop-
ment in the United States and Canada by enacting a common mining
code.5 16 This political compromise did not preclude litigation. In
New South Wales, the Australian High Court determined that the
Commonwealth had jurisdiction over the offshore submerged lands
below the low-water mark.51 7 The court found that state jurisdiction
ended at the low-water mark and that, even if the states had at one
time possessed rights in offshore submerged lands beyond that point,
such rights were relinquished upon federation.518 According to the
Australian High Court, the Commonwealth's jurisdiction over the
territorial sea and continental shelf was based on its external affairs
authority under section 51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution.51 9
The Australian High Court failed to recognize that the Crown
held sovereignty and dominion over the territorial sea under the com-
mon law of the nineteenth century. The case of Regina v. Keyn, upon
which the New South Wales court based its decision, was an anomaly
that addressed only the extent of admiralty jurisdiction, not the
Crown's dominion over offshore lands.520 This limitation was mani-
fested in the TWJA52I and in subsequent cases that considered the
territorial sea to be either a prerogative right of the Crown or Crown
property granted to the Australian colonies when they achieved self-
government.
522
The Australian High Court erroneously followed the reasoning
used by the United States and the Canadian Supreme Courts in their
515. Richard Cullen, Port MacDonnell PFA Inc. v. South Australia, 16 MONASH U. L.
REv. 128, 136 (1990).
516. For a discussion of this code, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
517. New South Wales v. Commonwealth, 135 C.L.R. 337, 374-75 (1975) (Austl.). For a
discussion on the High Court of Australia's majority opinion in New South Wales, see supra
notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
518. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 374-75.
519. Id.
520. Regina v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63, 161-62 (Eng.); see also supra notes 115-37, 153-60.
521. 41 & 42 Victs. (1878) (U.K.); cited in McEnvoy, supra note 128, at 297 n.58; see also
supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
522. See supra notes 198-231 and accompanying text.
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tidelands decisions. 523 According to the United States Supreme
Court, (1) coastal state jurisdiction ended at the low-water mark,
(2) the federal government's jurisdiction over navigation, national de-
fense, international affairs, and commerce established paramount
rights beyond the low-water mark, and (3) an aspect of these para-
mount rights was dominion over the resources located therein.524 In
so holding, the United States Supreme Court confused dominion with
sovereignty and failed to acknowledge the Atlantic states' historic
claims over offshore areas were traceable to the Crown.
The Canadian Supreme Court, relying on Regina v. Keyn, deter-
mined that provincial jurisdiction ended at the low-water mark.525
According to the Canadian Supreme Court, the Crown's rights over
the territorial sea were initially granted to the federal government
when it achieved independence. 526 The federal government then as-
serted its jurisdiction over the territorial sea by signing the Conven-
tions on the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf.527 The Canadian
Supreme Court, like the Australian High Court, failed to recognize
the Crown's proprietary and sovereign rights over the territorial sea
in the nineteenth century. These rights were transferred to British
Columbia under Term 10 of the Terms of Union of British Columbia
with Canada and section 109 of the BNAA. 528 Moreover, like the
Australian High Court, the Canadian Supreme Court ignored the de-
cisions of provincial courts acknowledging provincial jurisdiction over
the territorial sea. In 1984, the Canadian Supreme Court failed to
attribute the proper significance to Newfoundland's exercise of sover-
eignty and dominion over its offshore submerged lands when it held
that Newfoundland lacked jurisdiction over the territorial sea and
continental shelf.529 Furthermore, the Canadian Supreme Court, like
the Australian High Court, erroneously determined that provincial
extra-territorial jurisdiction had only been exercised for the peace, or-
der, and good government of the province. 530 Both courts failed to
realize that the justification of exercising colonial extra-territorial ju-
523. See supra notes 408-99 and accompanying text.
524. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 29-41 (1947).
525. See Mineral Rights Reference, 1967 S.C.R. at 792-817.
526. Id. at 815-16.
527. Id. at 817-21.
528. 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 § 109 (1867) (U.K.); see also supra notes 469-70 and accompany-
ing text.
529. Newfoundland Reference, 5 D.L.R.4th 385 (1984) (Can.).
530. Id.
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risdiction for peace, order, and good government was unknown in the
nineteenth century.
The Australian High Court held that even if the states did pos-
sess rights over submerged offshore lands, these rights were surren-
dered to the Commonwealth because they were aspects of external
sovereignty. This decision equalized all the Australian states with re-
spect to their offshore claims.
The United States and Canadian Supreme Courts, similar to the
Australian High Court, also placed all states on an equal footing at
federation. For example, in United States v. Texas, the United States
Supreme Court required Texas to surrender all rights in submerged
lands beyond the three-mile limit, in order for it to be equally situated
with the other coastal states. 531 The Supreme Court failed to ac-
knowledge that there was no equal footing clause in the Texas Annex-
ation Agreement and that the equal footing clause applied not to
property rights, but to political rights. 532 This was the first time the
United States Supreme Court applied the equal footing clause to de-
prive a state of property upon entering the Union.533
The Canadian Supreme Court adopted the equal footing ration-
ale in the 1984 Newfoundland case. The court held that even if New-
foundland had possessed rights over offshore submerged lands prior
to federation, it relinquished those rights upon federation.53 4 The Ca-
nadian Supreme Court failed to recognize that there was no equal
footing clause in the Terms of Union of Newfoundland with Canada
or the BNAA.53 5 Furthermore, under the BNAA, the Canadian
provinces were not treated alike with regard to the ownership of natu-
ral resources. 53
6
The Australian High Court's finding that the Commonwealth's
capability, as external sovereign, to enter into treaties regarding off-
shore submerged lands provided the basis for the Commonwealth's
offshore jurisdiction537 exaggerated the scope of the Commonwealth's
531. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
532. Id. at 722 (Reed, J., dissenting).
533. Id.
534. Newfoundland Reference, 5 D.L.R.4th at 385.
535. See Terms of Union, supra note 493.
536. 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3 (1867) (U.K.). Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba were Cana-
dian provinces for many years before they gained control over their natural resources in 1930.
Separate agreements provided that the provinces be placed in the same position as the original
provinces. Natural Resources Reference, 145 D.L.R.3d 9, 34 (1983) (Can.).
537. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 374-75.
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external affairs authority. 538 The Commonwealth could enter treaties
as external sovereign, but this power did not determine whether the
federal or state governments had authority over the subject matter of
the treaty. This was a constitutional question. 539 The Common-
wealth's external affairs authority did not grant the Commonwealth
complete authority over the subject matter of the treaty. 54° As such,
the Commonwealth could only enact legislation to implement the pro-
visions of a treaty. Federal jurisdiction over offshore submerged lands
was not mandated by either the Convention on the Territorial Sea or
the Convention on the Continental Shelf. Further, if the logic of the
court were carried to its extreme, the Commonwealth could circum-
vent the federal nature of the Australian Constitution by entering in-
ternational treaties.
The United States and Canadian Supreme Courts also magnified
the extent of the federal government's external affairs authority. The
United States Supreme Court held that the federal government's
power over international affairs established paramount rights over the
offshore resources. 541 The Canadian Supreme Court determined that
the federal government's authority to act for the peace, order, and
good government of Canada established federal jurisdiction over off-
shore lands. 542 In addition, the Canadian Supreme Court, like the
Australian High Court, failed to distinguish between treaty making
and treaty implementation.5
43
The Australian High Court's holding that continental shelf
rights were a new principle of international law failed to recognize
that the Crown had previously exercised commercial rights beyond
the territorial sea whenever possible.544 If outer continental shelf
("OCS") energy development had been commercially or technologi-
cally possible in the nineteenth century, it would have been consid-
ered a prerogative right of the Crown, and OCS energy resources
would have been Crown royalties. 545 This prerogative right of the
538. See supra notes 304-18 and accompanying text.
539. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 445-51 (Stephen, J.).
540. See AusTL. CONST. § 51(xxix).
541. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 707; United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S.
699 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 19; see also supra notes 414-29 and accom-
panying text.
542. See Mineral Rights Reference, 1967 S.C.R. at 792; see also supra notes 458-62 and
accompanying text.
543. See supra notes 477-81 and accompanying text.
544. New South Wales, C.L.R. at 360-66; see supra notes 78-114 and accompanying text.
545. See supra notes 325-26 and accompanying text.
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Crown was granted to the colonies when they achieved self-govern-
ment.546 The Australian High Court was correct, however, in its as-
sertion that the recognition of continental shelf rights under
international law did not provide the basis for state jurisdictional
claims.5
47
The United States Supreme Court failed to acknowledge the
Crown's sovereignty and dominion over offshore areas prior to its in-
dependence. 548 The Crown's offshore rights passed directly to the
states under the Treaty of Paris in 1783 and were not transferred to
the federal government under the United States Constitution. 549 The
Submerged Lands Act, which was enacted in 1953, established an his-
toric test to determine the extent of state offshore jurisdiction. 550
The Canadian Supreme Court failed to recognize that New-
foundland was a dominion prior to federation with Canada.5 1 By
1949, continental shelf rights were established as a principle of cus-
tomary international law and existed ab initio and ipsofacto.552 New-
foundland, as a sovereign state, acquired such rights prior to
federation and preserved them by the Terms of Union.553
The Australian High Court's decision, like those of the United
States and Canadian Supreme Courts, generated subsequent political
negotiations and settlements. 554 In Australia, negotiations between
the federal and state governments resulted in the "Agreed Arrange-
ments." 555 Subsequent statutory changes resulting from the arrange-
ments granted the states title and jurisdiction over the territorial
sea.556 For example, the Federal Common Mining Code, which gov-
erns offshore development beyond the territorial sea, provides for roy-
alty sharing and state administration. 5 7 In the United States, the
546. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 405, 439; see also notes 232-57 and accompanying
text.
547. New South Wales, 135 C.L.R. at 366; Norway-Sweden Boundry Dispute, supra note
317.
548. See, e.g., United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975); see also supra notes 447-51 and
accompanying text.
549. See O'Connell, supra note 78.
550. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1305.
551. Newfoundland Reference, 5 D.L.R.4th at 385; see also Fitzgerald, Newfoundland,
supra note 2; supra notes 488-99 and accompanying text.
552. See supra notes 391-407 and accompanying text.
553. Terms of Union, supra note 493, term 37; see also supra note 495.
554. See supra notes 500-15.
555. CULLEN, supra note 500, at 108-09.
556. See supra note 506.
557. See Cullen, Bass Strait, supra note 25, at 223-26.
[Vol. 14:25
Australian Tidelands Controversy
Submerged Lands Act grants the states title over the territorial
seas.558 The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act establishes federal
government jurisdiction over the outer continental shelf and provides
for federal administration over OCS energy development with limited
state input.55 9 The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 also pro-
vides coastal states with control over offshore energy development. 56
In Canada, the Atlantic provinces have been successful in negotiating
with the federal government for participation in the administration of
offshore energy development and revenue sharing, as evidenced by the
Nova Scotia Agreement and Atlantic Accord.561
The Australian High Court and the United States and Canadian
Supreme Courts granted their federal governments jurisdiction over
offshore submerged lands. The courts determined that the offshore
submerged lands below the low-water mark were beyond state juris-
diction and thereby subject to the federal governments' external af-
fairs authority. However, the courts failed to acknowledge the
development of offshore rights under the common law and exagger-
ated the federal governments authority over external affairs. The
courts confused dominion, which is based on domestic law, with sov-
ereignty, which is based on international law. The courts' decisions
also frustrated the design of federalism in all three constitutional sys-
tems. The courts should have relied on their respective common laws,
rather than on emerging concepts of international law. The adoption
of international law by the courts to resolve domestic constitutional
disputes deprived coastal states of their petroleum-rich offshore lands.
558. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1305.
559. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986);
see also Warren Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier, 6
STAN. L. REV. 23 (1953).
560. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988); Edward A.
Fitzgerald, Secretary of Interior v. California: Should Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales Be
Subject to Consistency Review?, 12 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 425 (1985) [hereinafter Fitzger-
ald, Secretary of Interior v. California]; Edward A. Fitzgerald, Thresher Sharks Protect the
Coastal Zone, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 561 (1987) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, Thresher
Sharks]. See generally Jack H. Archer, Evolution of Major 1990 CZMA Amendments: Restor-
ing Federal Consistency and Protecting Coastal Water Quality, 1 TERRITORIAL SEA J. 191
(1991).
561. Ian T. Gault, Recent Developments in the Federal-Provincial Dispute Concerning Ju-
risdiction Over Offshore Petroleum Resources, 21 ALTA. L. REV. 97 (1983); Ian T. Gault, Juris-
diction over the Petroleum Resources of the Canadian Continental Shelf- The Emerging
Principle, 23 ALTA. L. REV. 75 (1985); G.J. Doucet, Canadian-Nova Scotia Offshore Agree-
ment: One Year Later, 22 ALTA. L. REV. 132 (1984). The 1982 Nova Scotia Accord has been
modified to comport with the Atlantic Accord. See Cullen, Canada and Australia, supra note
25, at 80; CULLEN, supra note 500, at 189-90.
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As a result, subsequent political settlements were necessary to miti-
gate the adverse effects of these erroneous decisions. Nevertheless,
coastal states have continued their struggle in the judicial and polit-
ical arenas to participate in and share the revenues derived from off-
shore energy development.5 62
562. Cullen, Canada and Australia, supra note 25; Fitzgerald, Secretary of Interior v. Cali-
fornia, supra note 560; Fitzgerald, Thresher Sharks, supra note 560; see also Edward A. Fitz-
gerald, California v. Watt: Congressional Intent Bows to Judicial Restraint, 11 HARV. ENvTL.
L. REV. 147 (1987); Edward A. Fitzgerald, Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Revenues:
Coastal States Should Be Entitled to a Share, 16 COASTAL MGMT. 319 (1988).
